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Government in Opposition 
abstract .  In the past generation, in countries in all parts of the world, using all different 
forms of constitutional government, a new form of separation of powers has emerged in greater 
numbers, what this Article calls “government in opposition.” After democratic elections are held, 
power to govern is granted to the winners of those elections—but substantial power to govern is 
also granted to the losers of those elections as well. This Article first discusses how this emerging 
regime of separation of powers differs from other major forms of separation of powers, and in 
doing so introduces a new way of understanding the major systems of separated power that the 
world’s constitutional democracies have created. After providing some examples and illustrations 
of how this new, government in opposition system of separated powers operates—and why it 
has proven to be so consequential in so many countries—this Article discusses how government 
in opposition rules have much to offer constitutional designers around the world. In fragile 
democracies and stable democracies alike, government in opposition rules can better constrain 
power and stabilize the core elements of constitutional democracy, better prepare all parties to 
govern effectively, more fairly involve all interests in the process of governing—and can do all of 
this at minimal cost. To illustrate this point, this Article closes with a discussion of how 
government in opposition rules might work in the United States, and how they might remedy 
some of the current political and constitutional problems that we face. 
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introduction 
We all remember Wednesday morning, November 5, 2008, the morning 
after the 2008 American presidential election between Republican Presidential 
nominee John McCain and Democratic Presidential nominee Barack Obama. 
President-elect Obama won a clear majority of the national popular vote, a 
landslide in the electoral vote, and his Democratic Party captured more seats in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. But imagine if the next day, 
despite such a major Democratic victory, because of a constitutional or other 
legal obligation, Obama was required to name a Republican such as Senator 
Orrin Hatch as his Attorney General—putting Hatch in control of the future of 
judicial appointments and wiretapping programs—and Obama was required to 
name his former rival McCain as his new Secretary of Defense, in charge of 
Obama’s military policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
This idea about government—of granting losing political parties the right 
not just to dissent from and obstruct the efforts of the winning political party, 
but also to exercise the power to govern as well—is an approach to government 
I call “government in opposition.” In the past several decades, rules granting 
losing, minority parties the power to act like winning, majority parties—rules 
this Article references as government in opposition rules—have spread around 
the globe, infusing the fundamental law of dozens of democratic countries, 
including countries as diverse as Argentina, Britain, Chile, Germany, and 
South Africa. Such government in opposition rules helped resolve 
constitutional crises in post-apartheid South Africa, are at the core of the 
discussion about how to resolve the current political crisis in Zimbabwe, and 
have dominated the constitutional discussions when leaders in Afghanistan and 
Iraq met to draft their new constitutions. 
The spread of government in opposition rules as a means of dividing power 
among political groups is one of the most consequential innovations in 
constitutional design in the past several decades. Indeed, when Great Britain 
first experimented with government in opposition rules in the early nineteenth 
century, then-Harvard University President Lawrence Lowell called it “the 
greatest contribution of the nineteenth century to the art of government.”1 Yet 
governments in opposition rules have received almost no attention in the 
academic literature. In legal scholarship, there have been a few articles raising 
the possibility of the occasional, obscure rule that permits minorities of various 
 
1.  A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 451 (1924).  
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sorts to exercise majority power,2 and a few articles mentioning in passing 
specific examples of such rules.3 In the political science literature, Arend 
Lijphart makes an occasional, brief reference to government in opposition rules 
when discussing his idea of “consociationalism,”4 but devotes little attention to 
them, and unfortunately goes astray from government in opposition principles 
in important respects. But even these few and brief academic discussions of 
similar issues tend to focus on government in opposition rules as merely a 
random set of quirky, disconnected, and largely insignificant rules. There has 
been no discussion of how government in opposition rules—when grouped 
together—can form part of a deliberate, new, and alternative form of 
separation of powers. 
This Article is an exercise in comparative and American constitutional law, 
examining the constitutional approaches of many different countries in pursuit 
of the most desirable constitutional structure, both in general for all 
constitutional designers, and more specifically for the United States. This 
Article is therefore a mix of the analytical and the normative; analytical in the 
sense that this Article is presenting an innovative “new”5 or “newer”6 
separation of powers that has eluded the attention of scholars to this point; and 
normative in the sense that this Article offers a partial (albeit qualified) 
endorsement of the many institutional virtues of this emerging addition to 
separation of powers technologies, for the United States and for all other sorts 
of constitutional democracies. 
Part I will begin our exploration of government in opposition by examining 
how constitutions around the world and in the United States have decided to 
 
2.  See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1385 (2008); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) 
[hereinafter Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding]; Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, Second-Order Diversity]; Adrian Vermeule, 
Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74 (2005). For 
further discussion of these articles and their relationship to this Article, see infra Section 
II.A. 
3.  See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1051-52 (2004); Daryl J. 
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2316, 
2368-75 (2006). 
4.  See, e.g., Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969) (discussing 
how fragmented societies divide power among ethnic groups to preserve stability). 
5.  Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000) (presenting the 
idea of parliamentary democracies with constitutional courts as the “new” form of 
separation of powers). 
6.  See Cindy Skach, The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
93 (2007) (arguing that semipresidential systems of separation of powers are an even more 
recent system of separation of powers than the form Ackerman discusses). 
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separate powers among winning and losing political coalitions.7 One of the 
fundamental issues of constitutional design that countries have addressed as 
part of these divisions of powers is how to divide authority among winning 
political coalitions. Parliamentary systems largely avoid this question by 
creating a singular winner who controls almost all of the levers of government. 
By contrast, other systems (presidential and semipresidential) create the 
potential for multiple winning political coalitions and divide bundles of 
authority between these multiple winners among the branches or levels of 
government, or within the branches of government. 
But while these systems recognize and protect losing political parties, they 
do not give these losing parties the substantial powers afforded to winning 
coalitions to govern and to make law (what this Article will term “winners’ 
powers”). As Part II discusses, then, government in opposition rules differ 
 
7.  Two important points must be made about this very purposeful use of the phrase political 
coalitions, and the discussion of how constitutions divide power among political coalitions. 
First, there are other criteria that constitutions might use to divide authority among 
different groups beyond which political coalition one belongs to—for instance, ethnic or 
religious groups might be considered “majorities” or “minorities,” rather than political 
parties receiving more or less votes being considered as the relevant majorities and 
minorities. In Canada, for instance, there is a polarizing debate about whether to grant 
“asymmetrical powers for Quebec . . . . in order to give it the jurisdictional tools to preserve 
and promote its [ethnic, linguistic and even religious] identity.” Sujit Choudhry, Does the 
World Need More Canada? The Politics of the Canadian Model in Constitutional Politics and 
Political Theory, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606, 632 (2007). In Lebanon, some governmental 
positions have been apportioned according to religious background. See, e.g., Richard Hrair 
Dekmejian, Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon, 10 COMP. POL. 251, 254 
(1978) (discussing the situation in Lebanon whereby a ratio of six Christians to five 
Muslims are seated in the Chamber and there is an even division in the Cabinet). This 
Article, though, does not focus on ethnic or religious majorities or minorities and how 
power is allocated between those groups, unless those cleavages are in some way relevant to 
the distribution of power between electoral majorities and minorities. 
 A second important point about the use of the phrase “political coalition” is the 
decision to use the word coalition rather than party. To the American reader, the use of the 
word “coalition” is not necessary. As a practical matter, in the American system there is 
competition between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and so all I need 
discuss is the division of power between the winning party and the losing party rather than 
the winning and losing coalition, with some exceptions—such as Ross Perot winning 
nineteen percent of the nationwide popular vote in 1992, and Ralph Nader perhaps tipping 
the balance in the State of Florida to George W. Bush. See YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, THE 
ROUTLEDGE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 142 (2001). More commonly, 
though, the winner in democratic elections around the world consists of several parties, and 
the loser also consists of several parties. Since this is an exploration of government in 
opposition mostly in those countries, account must be taken of the presence of several 
political parties on the winner and loser side, and so this Article refers to winning and losing 
political coalitions rather than singular parties. 
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from these other regimes of separation of powers not in their treatment of 
winning coalitions, but in their treatment of losing coalitions, and their 
recognition that losing political coalitions should also have the capacity to 
exercise the power that winning coalitions usually posses to govern and to 
make law. Part II focuses on the different mechanisms that have been used in 
various countries to empower losing parties in this way—to give losers the 
power to govern in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In several 
other papers beyond this Article, I take up other tasks related to the discussion 
in Part II of the emergence of government in opposition rules, such as 
examining how these rules were created in part because they were seen as 
better forms of protection for political minorities than judicial review, and how 
the emergence of these rules has changed the nature of political opposition in 
Western democracies, including the United States. 
After Part II, this Article turns to a discussion of whether government in 
opposition rules would be welcome additions to how the power to govern is 
distributed, focusing first in Part III on how these rules benefit all 
constitutional systems, and then in Part IV more specifically on what these 
rules could add to the American constitutional system. As part of this analysis, 
these Parts argue that government in opposition rules are constructive 
additions to the institutional design of countries that fall anywhere on the 
spectrum from the most to the least “fragile democracies.”8 Government in 
opposition rules are welcome parts of constitutional systems, in other words, 
for the over two-hundred-year-old Constitution of the United States, as well as 
for the new and incredibly fragile constitution of Iraq. 
As Part III discusses, government in opposition rules help resolve one of 
the most problematic and underappreciated questions in constitutional design: 
how to prevent a very successful political movement from gaining too much 
control—what this Article calls the problem posed by the “illiberal democrat.”9 
 
8.  See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007). 
9.  I borrow this phrase “illiberal democracy” from Fareed Zakaria. See FAREED ZAKARIA, THE 
FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 17 (2003) (“Across the 
globe, democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed 
through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limitations on their power and 
depriving their citizens of basic rights.”). Various other phrases have been used to describe 
the phenomenon that Zakaria is describing, such as Guillermo O’Donnell’s use of the phrase 
“delegative democracy.” See Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 1, 
59-60 (1994) (“Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the 
presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit.”). But illiberal democracies and 
delegative democracies are different from what is called “competitive” or “electoral” 
authoritarianism. In that situation, the elections themselves are unfair, even beyond what 
suppressions of rights follow from the elections. See Tom Ginsburg, Lessons from Democratic 
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Whether it is a result of the actions of a Roosevelt or a Bush in the United 
States—or a Blair or Putin overseas—constitutional democracies and the idea of 
checks and balances are shaken to their cores when a hugely successful political 
leader, elected apparently legitimately at the ballot box, captures all of the 
branches and powers of government. This is because the other major 
modalities of separation of powers, after either one election or many elections, 
permit winning political coalitions to exercise almost unlimited power. Adding 
government in opposition rules, by contrast, permits losing coalitions to 
maintain real power and constrain successful political figures, regardless of 
how successful particular winning coalitions might be in democratic elections. 
Government in opposition rules not only better constrain winning 
coalitions, but they also better train losing political coalitions—losing parties 
under such rules have experience using the powers afforded by the 
government, and therefore are ready to assume power should they win 
elections or otherwise be called upon to exercise substantial control over the 
levers of power. At bottom, losing political coalitions are also treated more 
fairly, because when they receive a major portion of the vote, they are also 
permitted control of major parts of the process of governing. 
Part IV turns to the American scene, and discusses some of the benefits that 
a framework government in opposition statute or constitutional amendment 
would have for the American constitutional system. It suggests the adoption of 
a regime that would guarantee that some significant number of executive, 
legislative, and judicial positions of authority be granted to losing political 
coalitions. Such a regime would help resolve the central crisis posed by the 
current American separation of powers, that of “unified government,” when 
one political party controls all of the levers of power. This regime would ensure 
that even during unified government, the dominant political coalition is 
constrained. Moreover, this new regime would ensure that losing political 
coalitions are adequately represented, in the political and bureaucratic process, 
in a way that both parties when in power have prevented for decades. No 
matter how much the winning political coalition might want, the main losing 
political voices would not only be heard in our institutions of government, but 
would also occasionally govern. 
 
Transitions: Case Studies from Asia, 52 ORBIS 91, 92 (2008) (“Electoral authoritarianism refers 
to a system with the apparent trappings of democracy, such as elections and a nominally 
independent media and judiciary, in which channels for participation and accountability are 
manipulated and constrained to ensure dominance of one faction.”). 
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i .  separations of powers:  the constitutional law of 
winning political coalitions and losing political 
coalitions 
As we will see in this Part, several centuries of constitutional design have 
yielded many approaches to dividing authority among winning political 
coalitions and losing political coalitions, in part by presenting different answers 
to one of the central questions related to the constitutional separations of 
powers: “How many elections should a political movement win before gaining 
how much lawmaking authority?”10 One regime of separation of powers 
(“parliamentarism”11) requires winning coalitions to win one election, and 
solely by virtue of winning that one election, this political coalition  
obtains “full authority.”12 Other regimes (“[p]residentialism”13 and 
“semipresidentialism”14) require winning coalitions to win several—and several 
different types—of elections, and until and unless these winning coalitions 
achieve these victories, such a constitution grants the various winning 
coalitions different types of powers either within a branch and level of 
government, or among the branches and levels of government. Separation of 
powers regimes, in addition to addressing issues related to the allocation of 
authority among winning coalitions, also provide protection for losing political 
coalitions. But, as this Part will discuss and as Part II expands on, these 
existing separation of powers technologies only recognize powers for losing 
coalitions as losing coalitions—there is no provision for granting winning 
coalitions’ powers not just to electorally triumphant parties or coalitions, but 
also to electorally defeated parties or coalitions. 
 
10.  See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 643. 
11.  See Skach, supra note 6, at 95 (“Parliamentarism is characterized by a fusion of powers and a 
mutual dependence between the executive and the legislative powers. This is due to the fact 
that the chief executive (usually a prime minister or chancellor) emanates from the 
legislature after elections and needs the confidence of the legislature in order for his 
government to survive the duration of the legislature’s term.”). 
12.  See Ackerman supra note 5, at 648 (defining full authority as when “the same party wins 
enough elections in a row to take control of all the relevant powers”). 
13.  See Skatch, supra note 6, at 95-96 (“Presidentialism is the opposite: it is a system 
characterized by the separation of powers and a mutual independence of the executive and 
legislative powers. This is because the chief executive (a popularly elected president) and the 
legislature are elected independently of each other, for fixed terms of office, and both can 
survive for their respective terms without the other’s approval.”). 
14.  See id. at 93 (“[S]emipresidentialism . . . . combines a popularly elected head of state with a 
head of government who is responsible to a popularly elected legislature.”). 
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A. Terminological Preliminaries: Winners’ Powers and Losers’ Powers 
This Article discusses political “winning coalitions” and political “losing 
coalitions.” The political coalition that receives a controlling share of the vote 
in a democratic election is the “winner” of that election. When French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, for instance, was elected President of France on 
May 6, 2007, The New York Times referenced his “triumph” and declared him 
the “elected president” of France.15 And just as elections produce winning 
parties or coalitions, they also produce losing parties or coalitions. The 
Democratic Party and its nominee John Kerry lost the 2004 American 
presidential election; Segolene Royal and the French Socialists lost the 2007 
French presidential election. Elections, in other words, produce winning 
political coalitions and losing political coalitions. 
This is all obvious and basic so far, but the important point to be made is 
not just that elections produce winning coalitions and losing coalitions, but 
also that the powers afforded by government range on a continuum from the 
ideal types of winners’ powers to losers’ powers. On one end of the conceptual 
spectrum are winners’ powers. The power to govern means having the capacity 
to use the sovereign power of the state to order and coerce binding, obligatory 
endeavors. The power to govern gives the entity exercising that power the 
capacity to control the operations of entities of government in order to coerce 
action. This might mean controlling the agenda of a committee or of a 
legislature, or enacting statutes, or controlling a panel of judges that will issue 
a binding decision. The power to govern, then, is a classic Weberian power, 
meaning that it is really the power to control the legitimate use of violence by 
the government.16 
On the other end of the conceptual spectrum are losers’ powers.17 Rather 
than the power to use the sovereign capacity of the state to command and 
control matters, losers’ powers are the power to act as a minority, not the 
power to act as a majority—losers’ powers are powers to prevent the exercise of 
winners’ powers. Losers’ powers can involve having the power to dissent, to 
 
15.  See Elaine Sciolino, Sarkozy, Elected in France, Vows Break With Past, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 
2007, at A1. 
16.  See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 56, 65 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922). 
17.  The concept of losers’ powers is also captured, albeit not in the legal or constitutional (and 
more in the political) sense by George Tsebelis, who talks about “veto players,” political 
actors who have the power to prevent government from acting. See George Tsebelis, 
Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, 
Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289 (1995). 
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note the problems with what the government is doing.18 Losers’ powers can 
involve the power to obstruct, to prevent winning coalitions from doing what 
they so desire, as is seen via the usage of a special procedural mechanism such 
as the legislative filibuster. Importantly, though, when an entity uses its losers’ 
powers, the power of government to act is not invoked, but rather is prevented 
or forestalled from being invoked. Losers’ powers are the power to block and 
forestall; winners’ powers are the power to legislate and to coerce. 
Of course, in reality these conceptual extremes blur together. The filibuster 
in the United States Senate might seem like an example of losers’ powers, 
because it permits a group of Senators to prevent the Senate from approving a 
law. In practice, though, by filibustering one law, this group of Senators might 
be forcing other Senators, the House of Representatives, and the President to 
negotiate and bargain with them, thereby giving them more ability to influence 
the enactment of a law—more ability to exercise, practically speaking, winners’ 
powers. So it is important to remember that within every power might be some 
elements of winners’ powers and some of losers’ powers. The distinction is not 
binary, but rather on a continuum.  
It is important to distinguish between winning coalitions and losing 
coalitions, and winners’ and losers’ powers, because this Part will examine how 
these two axes of constitutional design have been used to create different 
regimes of separation of powers in different countries. None of the traditional, 
established regimes recognize that winners’ powers and losers’ powers do not 
need to be granted exclusively to winning coalitions and to losing coalitions. 
One of the innovations of government in opposition, then, is the structural 
point that winning coalitions are not necessarily given all winners’ powers, and 
losing coalitions are not granted solely losers’ powers. Winning coalitions can 
be given losers’ powers (which is presumably less controversial) but losing 
coalitions can also be given some—and some substantial—winners’ powers. 
B. Apportioning Winners’ Powers: Parliamentary and Presidential Regimes 
Existing separation of powers regimes recognize a singular winning 
coalition or multiple winning coalitions, and then allocate the substantial 
 
18.  See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1752 (“This Article uses the term 
‘dissenter’ in a more specific sense, to refer to someone who subscribes to an outlier view on 
an issue that she deems salient to her identity. A dissenter is someone whom we would 
naturally term an ‘electoral minority’ because of the positions she holds.”); see, e.g., STEVEN 
H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA, at xi (1999) (defining 
dissent as “speech that criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or 
authorities”). 
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majority of winners’ powers to the singular winner or among the several 
winning coalitions. In parliamentary systems, there is a singular winner, and 
this winner is granted the substantial majority of available winners’ powers, 
with very few constraints on these powers which are unrelated to the winning 
coalitions’ powers. In presidential and semipresidential systems, there are (or 
at least can be19) multiple winning coalitions, and each winner is granted the 
substantial majority of winners’ powers that are associated either within a 
different branch of government, a particular subdivision of one part of 
government, or of a different level of government. This strategy, then, by 
creating multiple winning coalitions and giving them separate and (often) 
overlapping bundles of winners’ powers to use against one another and to 
further their power, ensures that, as James Madison famously said in Federalist 
51, “ambition [is] made to counteract ambition.”20 In none of these systems, 
though, are losing coalitions given the power to control government. 
First of all, in many parliamentary regimes, “a political movement need win 
only one election before gaining plenary authority.”21 This is because legislative 
and executive powers are not separated, but are conjoined, and the winner of 
an election is granted all of the legislative power, as well as all of the executive 
power. A voter in these parliamentary systems casts a single ballot, for a 
political party, and the party or parties receiving the most ballots then selects 
(usually) the leader of their party22 to become the executive in control of the 
 
19.  Just as winning coalitions in parliamentary systems control all of the levers of power, so too 
can winning coalitions in presidential and semipresidential systems control all of the levers 
of power, but in the latter systems they must win several elections to do so. So, while in 
parliamentary systems there is always one winner, in presidential systems there is the 
possibility of more than one winner. When there is one winner that controls all of the 
bundles of winning coalitions’ powers in a presidential or semipresidential system 
(“unified” government), the unity of power causes problems in such a system similar to 
those faced in parliamentary systems. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 3, at 2315 
(“Recognizing that these dynamics shift from competitive when government is divided to 
cooperative when it is unified calls into question many of the foundational assumptions of 
separation-of-powers law and theory.”). 
20.  THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001). 
21.  Ackerman, supra note 5, at 643. 
22.  It is not always the case that the leader of the party receiving the most votes is selected as the 
Prime Minister. In Japan, for instance, the Prime Minister selected after the 1993 election 
was from the Socialist Party, not from the Liberal Democrats, even though that party had 
three times as many seats. In Norway, after the 2001 election the Prime Minister was 
selected from the fifth-most successful party, the Christian People’s Party. See Geoffrey 
Palmer, The Cabinet, The Prime Minister and the Constitution, 4 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 1, 25 
n.55 (2006). The only limitation is that the Prime Minister selected must be from the 
winning coalition, even if the Prime Minister is not from the plurality party. 
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government. In Great Britain, for instance, in the 1997 elections forty-four 
percent of those casting a ballot cast a singular ballot for Labour, thirty-one 
percent for the Conservatives, seventeen percent for the Liberal Democrats, and 
seven percent for other parties.23 Because this meant that the Labour Party won 
418 out of 658 seats in the House of Commons, it became the majority party in 
the Commons. The House of Commons selects the Prime Minister, and so led 
by the Labour Party, the House of Commons selected Tony Blair to be the next 
Prime Minister of Great Britain. This meant that, by virtue of winning the 1997 
parliamentary elections, Blair controlled the executive branch, and elected 
political figures associated with him controlled the legislative branch as well. A 
leader in a British-style parliamentary regime must ensure that he or she 
receives the support of the members of his winning coalition in the legislature 
and in the cabinet, but this normally does not present problems for the British 
Prime Minister, since unified party voting transpires “so close to 100 percent 
[of the time] that there [is] no . . . point in measuring it.”24 
In parliamentary systems, the primary political constraints on winning 
coalitions and their exercise of winners’ powers come from within the same 
winning coalition—which means that all winners’ powers are exercised by 
winning coalitions. In presidential and semipresidential systems, another 
source of constraint is the potential for the exercise of winners’ powers by 
several different winning coalitions. This is the strategy used in presidential 
regimes: winning coalitions exercising winners’ powers constraining other 
winning coalitions and their exercise of winners’ powers. The various winning 
coalitions recognized by presidential regimes can either be located among the 
branches of government (presidentialism), or both among and within a branch 
of government (semipresidentialism). 
In presidential systems, since there is a directly elected executive and a 
separately elected legislature, there is the potential for different winning 
coalitions, and each winner is granted its own bundle of winners’ powers. As a 
practical matter, since almost every presidential country with a legislature has 
two houses in the legislature, this means that in presidential systems, rather 
than there being a singular winner (as in a parliamentary system), there is the 
potential for at least two and sometimes three winning coalitions: the winner 
 
23.  See Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart & Paul F. Whiteley, New Models for New Labour: 
The Political Economy of Labour Party Support, January 1992-April 1997, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
559, 559 n.1 (1998). 
24.  SAMUEL H. BEER, MODERN BRITISH POLITICS 350 (1965). This is true even though there is a 
“higher incidence of backbench rebellion and dissent . . . [since] the mid-1960’s.” Anthony 
Mughan & Roger M. Scully, Accounting for Change in Free Vote Outcomes in the House of 
Commons, 27 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 640, 640 (1997). 
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of the presidency, and the winner of elections for each house of the legislature. 
Therefore, while in parliamentary systems the checks on winning coalitions 
come from within the winning coalition, in presidential systems the checks on 
winning coalitions derive from the existence of other winning coalitions and 
their usage of winners’ powers. One key element of constitutional design, 
though, remains the same, and differentiates these systems from government 
in opposition: the checks on winning coalitions come from one version or 
another of winning coalitions and winning coalitions utilizing winning 
coalitions’ powers. 
Another version of presidential government, rather than creating the 
potential for multiple winning coalitions, and granting them the bundles of 
winning coalitions’ powers that go with control of a particular branch of 
government, is to divide up the bundles of powers that go with control of a 
particular branch of government. This can happen with the executive branch, 
where one winner (the directly elected executive) is granted one bundle of 
executive winners’ powers, and another winner (the executive accountable to 
the legislative majority coalition) is granted another bundle of executive 
winners’ powers. This form of government is usually called 
“semipresidentialism,” and has grown in popularity in recent years. Indeed, 
when the Berlin Wall fell and about thirty or so countries crafted constitutions, 
the most common constitutional form chosen was semipresidentialism.25 The 
directly elected and superior executive, as one winner, is given certain winners’ 
powers; the deputy executive, as another winner, is given a certain bundle of 
winning coalitions’ powers, and then the winning coalitions of the elections for 
the two branches of the legislature are given their own bundle of winning 
coalitions’ powers. The conflict—and the check—then operates in the same 
manner that it does in a purely presidential regime. There are different 
winning coalitions, and the winning coalitions are constrained by other 
winning coalitions and by winner-related institutions exercising winning 
coalitions’ powers. 
Another institutional variation of this notion of multiple winners exercising 
overlapping bundles of winners’ powers comes in the form of federalism. Even 
more than winners’ powers being granted to winners of federal elections, the 
winners of various state elections are granted winners’ powers. It is still the 
case, though, that only winning coalitions are granted winners’ powers—there 
are just more and more varied winning coalitions because there are political 
coalitions that have triumphed at the state level as well as at the federal level. 
 
25.  See Skach, supra note 6, at 93. 
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Parliamentary, presidential, and semipresidential democracies all feature 
institutions that cannot be categorized neatly as winning coalitions or losing 
coalitions, and are what this Article calls “winner-related institutions.” These 
institutions—while not themselves elected and therefore not directly part of 
winning coalitions—are appointed or empowered by winning coalitions. 
Perhaps the most notable example of this—of winner-related institutions 
exercising winners’ powers—is the constitutional court, a court with the power 
to invalidate laws passed by a legislature for running afoul of a constitution. 
No matter how bureaucratic and nonpolitical the mentality of these 
constitutional courts in all forms of democracies, by and large constitutional 
court judges still are appointed through political processes controlled by 
winning coalitions,26 and they enter the judicial system already possessing 
notoriety and reputations.27 The result is that, although in imperfect ways, 
constitutional courts in parliamentary democracies have strong ties to winning 
political coalitions because they are appointed by these winning coalitions. 
This situation creates all sorts of principal-agent problems, meaning that 
courts are imperfect winner-related institutions, but are winner-related 
institutions nonetheless, and should the winner so desire, can be manipulated 
by winning political coalitions. An extreme example of this comes from Japan. 
In Japan, the justices of the supreme court are appointed by the party that 
controls the executive branch,28 meaning the Prime Minister appointed by the 
winning coalitions that control the Diet, the most powerful house of the 
Japanese legislature.29 The leaders of this all-powerful winning coalition 
appointing the supreme court justices always “appoint justices old enough 
(generally in their early 60s) not to change their views before mandatory 
 
26.  See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, A Comparative View of the Chief Justice’s Role: Guardians of the 
Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet 
Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1757, 1766 (2006) (“Constitutional judges are typically selected by 
some combination of presidential or prime ministerial appointment and parliamentary 
approval . . . .”). It is still the case, though, that there are elements of the judicial system that 
cannot be called winner-related, because they operate using principles similar to the civil 
service. See id. at 1767 (“Within countries that have constitutional courts, ordinary court 
judges typically have civil service careers in which they enter the lower-level judiciary first 
and are promoted up through the ranks on the basis of seniority and merit.”). 
27.  See id. at 1768 (“Because the vast majority of constitutional judges enter the judiciary from 
either academia or the higher reaches of politics, they are often well known before they issue 
any decisions at all.”). 
28.  See KENPƿ, art. 79, para. 1 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such 
number of judges as determined by law. All such judges except the Chief Judge shall be 
appointed by the Cabinet.”). 
29.  See id. art. 67, para. 1 (“The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of 
the Diet by a resolution of the Diet.”). 
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retirement at age 70.”30 The result has been that “the Japanese Supreme Court 
is deferential in the extreme.”31 
It should also be noted that not all institutions in parliamentary or both 
forms of presidential democracies can easily be characterized as obviously 
controlled by winning coalitions or losing coalitions, and so there are some 
sources of constraint even if winning coalitions succeed beyond the highest of 
expectations. Some institutions, such as bureaucratic institutions32 or careerist 
lower courts in some countries,33 are hardly related to winning or to losing 
political coalitions. And parliamentary democracies still have presidents, who 
might be from losing political parties, and can have significant powers in some 
countries.34 
Despite these structural differences between parliamentary, presidential, 
and semipresidential regimes, one fundamental similarity remains: the 
traditional versions of these regimes all feature winners’ powers that are 
exercised either directly by winning political coalitions or by those appointed 
 
30.  See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in 
Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331, 333 (2001). 
31.  Id. 
32.  This is particularly true in countries outside the United States, where fewer bureaucratic 
officials tend to be political appointees. Compare PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: 
FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 7-13 (1995) (“Between 1960 
and 1992, the number of department secretaries increased from 10 to 14, the number of 
deputy secretaries from 6 to 21, under secretaries from 14 to 32, deputy under secretaries 
from just 9 to 52, assistant secretaries from 81 to 212, deputy assistant secretaries from 77 to 
507.”), with Pablo T. Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, Political Appointees vs. Career Civil 
Servants: A Multiple Principals Theory of Political Bureaucracies, 10 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 465 
(1994) (noting that there are fewer political appointees outside the United States). 
33.  Germany has largely adopted the system used by West Germany, in which “German judges, 
after a three to five year probationary period, become career state employees with lifetime 
tenure. Whatever political influence exists on the recruitment and promotion of state 
judges, it is less than that for federal judges and is mediated mostly through state 
administrative bureaucracies and candidate self-selection.” David S. Clark, The Selection and 
Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1795, 1816 (1988). 
34.  Indeed, as one article discusses, the range of prominent powers held by presidents can 
include  
the president’s exclusive discretion to dissolve parliament (Italy), the requirement 
of countersignatures of cabinet decrees (Italy), suspensory veto over legislation 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia), the power to decree new laws (Greece for some time 
after 1975), and appointments to high offices, sometimes (as in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) including ministries. 
 Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A 
Critical Appraisal, 29 COMP. POL. 449, 451 (1997). 
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or otherwise strongly controlled by winning political coalitions. In 
parliamentary regimes, there is always a singular political winner; in 
presidential and semipresidential regimes, there are multiple political winners. 
But no matter what, winners’ powers are exercised by those political coalitions 
that, at one point or another, won a democratic election or curried the favor of 
those who won such an election. If you wanted to govern in any of the major 
constitutional democratic systems around the world, at least until recently, you 
had to win some form of election. 
i i .  a constitutional innovation: government in 
opposition 
After several hundred years of constitutional government, the manners in 
which powers are divided into constitutional democracies are relatively finite, 
as Part I discussed. Winners’ powers are given either to singular or multiple 
winning political coalitions; and losers’ powers are given to losing political 
coalitions. What has happened in the past several decades, though, has been 
the adoption of the idea that constraint and checks in separation of powers can 
be provided not just by dispersing winners’ powers among winning coalitions, 
but by actually granting such powers to losing political coalitions. As this Part 
will discuss, in the constitutions, statutes, and other foundational legal 
commitments recognized in many countries, the coercive, decisional power of 
the state is granted to those losing elections as well as those winning elections. 
To be clear, government in opposition is not a type of democratic system 
on its own, but rather an aspect of a democratic system. In countries with 
government in opposition rules, such rules do not obviate the question of 
whether there should be an independently elected executive (as in a 
presidential or semipresidential system) or whether the chief executive should 
be selected by another directly elected institution (the legislature, as in a 
parliamentary system); whether there should be two houses of the legislature 
or a single house of the legislature, and so on. In other words, there are still 
other foundational questions about what institutions to create, and what 
powers each institution should exercise. 
Even though constitutional designers have to resolve other questions of 
institutional structure in addition to questions about government in opposition 
rules, it is also the case that every constitutional system has to consider whether 
to adopt government in opposition rules. Arend Lijphart has argued that some 
forms of power-sharing are better suited for parliamentary than 
FONTANA_PREPRESS_V5CORRECTED.DOC 12/14/2009 9:09:43 AM 
the yale law journal  119:548   2009  
564 
 
semipresidential or presidential democracies,35 but it is emphatically the case 
that all forms of democracies have government in opposition rules. 
Parliamentary systems such as Britain and Germany have these rules; 
presidential systems such as Argentina and the United States have these rules; 
and semipresidential systems like Slovakia have these rules. In this way, 
whether to have government in opposition rules (and how many and what 
kinds to have) forms one of the few genuinely universal questions of 
institutional design that must be addressed and resolved by all constitutional 
designers in all democracies—and, as this Part will discuss, by all branches of 
democratic government. 
A. An Unnoticed Innovation in Constitutional Form 
This Part will discuss the various forms of government in opposition rules, 
and the key design questions that countries implementing these rules face, 
before turning to some examples of how these rules are used with great 
significance by all the branches of government that constitutional democracies 
have known. This discussion and typology of how government in opposition 
rules work and how they matter is necessary because, as mentioned briefly 
earlier, scholars have not really noticed government in opposition rules. 
Heather Gerken and Adrian Vermeule have both written helpful articles 
identifying a genre of rules which permit those in the minority to act as 
majorities on occasion. Vermeule labeled these rules “submajority rules,” which 
he has defined as rules which permit “a voting minority . . . the affirmative 
power to change the status quo.”36 Likewise, Gerken examines what she 
 
35.  See Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 101 
(2004) (arguing that power-sharing among parties works better in parliamentary systems 
because “the cabinet in a parliamentary system is a collegial decision-making body—as 
opposed to the presidential one-person executive with a purely advisory cabinet—it offers 
the optimal setting for forming a broad power-sharing executive”); see also Mainwaring & 
Shugart, supra note 34, at 454 (“[M]ost presidential democracies offer greater prospects of 
dividing the cabinet among several parties. This practice, which is essentially unknown 
among the Westminster parliamentary democracies, is common in multiparty presidential 
systems.”). This Article later discusses how Lijphart goes astray in including other forms of 
institutional structures along with government in opposition rules in his prescription of 
consociationalism. In addition, the descriptive part of Lijphart’s project misses out on how 
many countries are either partly or substantially consociational, or at least have substantial 
government in opposition rules, because his primary argument is that “consociationalism 
was successful in Belgium since the end of World War I, Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, and in 
Malaysia since 1955.” Jurg Steiner, Consociational Democracy as a Policy Recommendation: The 
Case of South Africa, 19 COMP. POL. 361, 364 (1987). 
36.  Vermeule, supra note 2, at 74. 
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entitles, in different places, “second-order diversity” and “dissenting by 
deciding,” which Gerken defines as “dissent taking the form of state action. . . . 
[in] disaggregated [institutions].”37 For both Vermeule and Gerken, though, 
this genre of rules empowering minorities are merely idiosyncratic phenomena, 
appearing in (somewhat) random and inconsequential places in political and 
social life; neither scholar appreciates how these rules have effected a 
revolution in constitutional separation of powers around the world.38 
If there is any area of scholarship that has recognized the comprehensive 
significance of government in opposition rules, it is the debate about Arend 
Lijphart’s notion of “consociational democracy.”39 But Lijphart’s discussion of 
these minority governance rules as systemic, government in opposition rules 
occurs when he groups together government in opposition rules with other 
types of rules, creating what he calls “consociational democracy,” which is 
characterized by government in opposition rules and other features. Beyond 
the basic idea of government in opposition—that losing parties should exercise 
winners’ powers, which are reflected in the “grand coalition” and 
“proportionality” parts of consociationalism—Lijphart adds a series of other 
rules that he argues are necessary parts of being classified as a consociational 
democracy. 
Lijphart also requires that each different political group have a mutual veto 
over major policy decisions affecting all groups,40 and that each group exercises 
“segmental authority”—the authority for each group to make its own policies, 
affecting only its own communities—for a regime to be consociational.41 
Because of this grouping together of government in opposition rules with other 
sorts of institutional arrangements, the precise benefits of these government in 
opposition rules in particular—not to mention how they came into existence 
and how they compare to other modalities of separating power—are lost. As 
 
37.  Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1747-48. 
38.  Indeed, Vermeule seems to believe that his “submajority rules” function primarily, if not 
exclusively, as transparency devices which empower political minorities to demand public 
accountability of majorities. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 74 (“Submajority rules enable 
minorities to force public accountability and transparency upon majorities, thereby 
increasing the force of principled deliberation and argument in official decisionmaking.”). 
The sorts of rules that Vermeule is discussing give losing coalitions winners’ powers that 
command winning coalitions to do things, such as provide information. In fact, though, as 
this Part discusses, government in opposition rules extend far beyond simply permitting 
minorities to demand sunlight be placed on majorities; they also give minorities real 
decisional authority. 
39.  See Lijphart, supra note 4, at 207. 
40.  See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 36-38 (1977). 
41.  Id. at 41-44. 
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Part III discusses, government in opposition rules constrain the exercise of 
winners’ powers in substantial but not excessive ways; when grouped together 
with the mutual veto and segmental autonomy aspects of consociationalism, 
Lijphart’s vision of power-sharing constrains the exercise of winners’ powers 
all too much by reinforcing political polarization and cleavages. 
B. A Typology of the Innovation in Constitutional Form 
One of the results of government in opposition rules not being studied as 
their own, distinctive, separately important phenomenon is that the many 
forms and types of government in opposition rules have been ignored. Before 
the emergence of government in opposition rules is presented, and the 
normative virtues of these rules are discussed, we must first understand the 
various forms of government in opposition rules. As the next two Parts will 
discuss, some aspects of government in opposition rules are more redeeming 
than others. 
One type of variation in government in opposition rules is the degree of 
legal or other coercion involved in the exercise of winners’ powers by losing 
coalitions. Consider the first type of rule, the mandatory government in 
opposition rule. This sort of rule means that, regardless of the preferences of 
the winning political coalition, losing political coalitions must exercise winners’ 
powers. 
The exact nature or legal source of the mandatory part of these rules might 
vary. For instance, the interim constitution that South Africa adopted in 1994 
required that parties receiving a certain percentage of the vote be granted 
executive deputy president positions.42 Some of the powers that the losing 
political coalition enjoys in Britain derive from a series of statutes enacted over 
the years, or from internal rules adopted by the legislature.43 The mandatory 
 
42.  See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(1) (“Every party holding at least 80 seats in the 
National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President from among 
the members of the National Assembly.”) (emphasis added). 
43.  The financial and other resource support that is provided to the opposition from the public 
fisc is a function of statute. See Ministerial and Other Salaries Act, 1997, c. 62 (Eng.); 
Ministerial and Other Salaries Act, 1975, c. 27 (Eng.); Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, 1 
Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 38 (Eng.). Some issues of resource support are defined by orders-in-
council, another form of legislation (one that is made under the name of the Queen by the 
Privy Council). See Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1994, S.I. 1994/3206 (U.K) 
(increasing salaries); Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1991, S.I. 1991/2886 (U.K) 
(increasing salaries); Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1987, S.I. 1987/1836 (U.K) 
(increasing salaries). Some other elements of losing coalition power, such as control over the 
proceedings of Parliament at certain moments, are provided by legislative rule. See AUTH. OF 
FONTANA_PREPRESS_V5CORRECTED.DOC 12/14/2009 9:09:43 AM 
government in opposition 
567 
 
part of the mandatory government in opposition rule might also stem from an 
informal—albeit practically binding—convention. In Argentina, the losing 
political coalition receives a certain percentage of committee chair positions, 
not by the command of a formal constitutional, statutory, or legislative rule, 
but as a matter of informal convention.44 
In contrast to mandatory government in opposition rules are rules which 
merely permit losing political coalitions to exercise winners’ powers. Contrast, 
for instance, the rule in the South African interim constitution requiring losing 
parties to be given executive deputy president positions with the situation in 
Great Britain during World War II. During World War II, Great Britain 
formed a “war cabinet,” meaning a cabinet composed of members of many 
different political coalitions, including the chief opposition party of Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill’s Conservative government, the Labour Party, and 
its leaders.45 Churchill was under no obligation to appoint these opposition 
leaders, but did so of his own volition. 
We could also add a third permutation of answers to the question of 
whether losing political coalitions are guaranteed by law to exercise winners’ 
powers. In addition to government in opposition rules requiring this result, or 
those permitting this result, we can also imagine rules which do not require 
government in opposition, but do more than merely permit it; they actually 
encourage it (so perhaps these rules fall on the spectrum between rules 
permitting government in opposition and those which mandate government in 
opposition). One genre of rule that could encourage opposition parties to 
exercise winners’ powers is a supermajority voting rule. It might be the case 
that the majority has a sufficient supermajority to be able to exercise all 
winners’ powers without needing the votes of members of losing coalitions. 
More likely still, the majority in a particular governmental entity might not 
have the requisite supermajority, but from time to time might be able to secure 
 
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 15, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmstords/105/105.pdf. Other parts of 
government in opposition in Britain stem from practically binding conventions, such as 
those providing that the opposition party will chair the Public Accounts Committee. See 
HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, FACTSHEET P2 PROCEDURE SERIES (JUNE 2009), available 
at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/P02.pdf. 
44.  See HONORABLE CÁMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE LA NACIÓN, REGLAMENTO DE LA CÁMARA DE 
DIPUTADOS DE LA NACIÓN, COMENTADO POR GUILLERMO CARLOS SCHINELLI (Dirección de 
Información Parlamentaria 1996). 
45.  See STEVEN F. HAYWARD, CHURCHILL ON LEADERSHIP: EXECUTIVE SUCCESS IN THE FACE OF 
ADVERSITY 146 (1997). 
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the votes of members of the minority in order to achieve the requisite 
supermajority margin for particular votes.46 
But supermajority rules also could lead to a situation where, rather than 
constantly trying to achieve minority votes in order to obtain the supermajority 
margin, the minority itself can exercise winners’ powers a certain part of the 
time. In Germany, for instance, “[h]alf the members of the Federal 
Constitutional Court [(FCC)] [are] elected by the Bundestag and half by the 
Bundesrat.”47 In practice, “[t]he Bundestag appoints its members through a 
two-thirds vote of a Judicial Selection Committee . . . and the Bundesrat 
through a two-thirds vote of the body as a whole.”48 The result has been that 
losing political parties as well as winning political parties have been able to 
nominate and appoint many of their own candidates to the FCC,49 and this 
system of losing political coalitions appointing judges because of supermajority 
rules is true of the appointments process for constitutional courts in several 
other countries as well.50 This has become the negotiated solution to the 
supermajority requirement; it is a government in opposition rule because it 
means that losing parties actually appoint judges to the FCC, and the 
framework FCC statute does not require it, but certainly encourages this by 
virtue of the supermajority requirement. 
In addition to the question of how aggressively to require or encourage—or 
permit—losing political coalitions to exercise winners’ powers in the first place, 
there is also the question of how to determine the precise amount of 
 
46.  This would be the situation, for instance, in a United States Senate where the majority party 
has sixty or more senators. In a situation where the majority political coalition does not have 
a filibuster-proof majority, it has two choices. It can make ad hoc arrangements, which is 
what happened as a result of the battle over judicial appointments in the United States in 
2005. Fourteen United States Senators—seven Democrats and seven Republicans—reached 
an agreement about how to handle particular judicial appointments, and reached a vague 
agreement about how to handle later appointments. See Charles Babington & Shailagh 
Murray, A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at A1. The 
other choice, though, is to reach a more permanent arrangement that permits the losing 
political coalition to exercise winners’ powers some of the time, and in return that the losing 
political coalition will support the exercise of winners’ powers by winning coalitions the rest 
of the time. 
47.  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law], May 8, 1949, art. 93 
(F.R.G.). 
48.  Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRY L. 49, 68 n.40 (2002). 
49.  See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 120-28 (1994) (tracing this 
system all the way back to the first appointment of Constitutional Court Justices in 1951). 
50.  See Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 67 (discussing similar approaches implemented in 
constitutional systems around the world, including in Bulgaria, Korea, and Mongolia). 
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government in opposition rules that a democratic system will feature. The 
means to determine the precise amount of government in opposition rules that 
a system will feature really vary on two axes, the first axis being how often these 
rules determining the amount of winners’ powers are revisited and revised, and 
the second axis being what formula is used to determine how many government 
in opposition rules there should be when these rules are examined (regardless 
of how often this revisiting of the amount of government in opposition rules 
might or might not transpire). In other words, democratic systems first have to 
answer whether the exact amount of government in opposition should be fixed 
or negotiated, and then whether government in opposition rules should be 
proportionate or determined according to some other formula. 
Some countries set in advance the exact amount of government in 
opposition power that will be exercised. The “Seven Member Rule” in the 
United States is a federal statute that empowers seven members of the House 
Committee on Government Operations or five members of the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate to compel information of “[a]n executive 
agency.”51 There is no negotiation or discussion after each election, or after 
each house of Congress is convened for a new session, to determine if members 
of the relevant committees shall have the power to compel information. That 
power for losing groups in Congress is fixed, in this case by statute. 
This fixed amount of government in opposition power to be exercised can 
be done by either fixing a formula—for instance, the understanding in Portugal 
that losing political coalitions will have the same percentage of committee chair 
positions as they occupy seats in the legislature52—or actually fixing a more 
precise, party-specific result, as is done in Switzerland, where since the 1959 
elections the main four political parties are each given a certain number of 
cabinet positions (and that amount did not change based on the results of later 
elections). After the 1959 elections in Switzerland, the Zauberformel (“magical 
formula”) was created, which provided that the Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
would be given two cabinet positions, the Christian Democratic People’s Party 
(CVP) would be given two cabinet positions, the Social Democratic Party 
(SPS) would be given two positions, and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) would 
be given one position.53 The alternative to these forms of fixing the amount of 
government in opposition power is to leave it up to negotiation after the 
 
51.  5 U.S.C. § 2954 (2006). 
52.  See NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, PAPER NO. 2, COMMITTEES IN 
LEGISLATURES: A DIVISION OF LABOR 16 (1996). 
53.  See Gerhard Lehmbruch, Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland, 23 
PUBLIUS 43, 50-51 (1993). 
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relevant election. For instance, the precise number of committee chair positions 
to be allocated to the opposition party in the British House of Commons varies 
from election to election, based on negotiations.54 
This addresses the questions of how the exact amount of government in 
opposition is determined, but there is also a question of how much government 
in opposition there will be. In general, this question seems to be answered one 
of two ways: (1) winners’ powers are divided proportionately (which, as was 
just mentioned, is used to apportion committee chair positions in Portugal), or 
(2) winners’ powers are divided through some other mechanism. For instance, 
in Canada certain legislative committees—not necessarily in an amount 
proportionate to the number of seats held by that party in the legislature—are 
traditionally chaired by the opposition party (in particular, the Public Accounts 
Committee in Canada is traditionally chaired by the opposition party).55 
The final variable in the institutional design of government in opposition 
rules is whether they are generally applicable, or whether they permit only losing 
coalitions to exercise potentially available winners’ powers. A generally 
applicable government in opposition rule is one that would permit any group 
not having a majority of the votes—no matter how constituted (meaning it 
could be constituted of defecting members of the winning political coalition as 
well as of members of the losing political coalition)—to exercise winners’ 
powers. The contrasting sort of rule is one that permits a minority grouping to 
exercise winners’ powers, but that minority grouping can be constituted only 
of members of a losing political coalition. 
The Seven Member Rule in the U.S. Congress mentioned earlier is a 
generally applicable rule, in that it permits any seven members of the House 
Committee on Government Operations and any five members of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate to compel information, 
regardless of whether these seven/five members are from the winning or from 
the losing political coalition.56 By contrast, the rules in the interim South 
African Constitution which entitled losing political coalitions to hold executive 
deputy president positions are not generally applicable government in 
opposition rules, and instead only provide for the exercise of executive power 
 
54.  See HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 43. 
55.  See C.E.S. Franks, The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of 
Commons, 4 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 461, 464 (1971). 
56.  See 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (“An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on Government 
Operations of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, or on request of 
the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, or any five members thereof, shall 
submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
committee.”) (emphasis added). 
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by the political parties who did not constitute the winning political coalition in 
the previous election. The interim constitution provided that any “party 
holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly” has the authority to appoint 
its own executive deputy president.57 
C. The Forms of Government in Opposition 
Before turning to the normative virtues of government in opposition rules 
in the next Part, this Section discusses the forms of government in opposition 
rules in the various branches of government.58 Government in opposition rules 
exist for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, in all forms of 
constitutional democracies. And in all forms of constitutional democracies, 
government in opposition rules have been structurally important aspects of the 
political dynamic. 
1. Legislative Government in Opposition 
First, in the legislative branch, losing political coalitions are sometimes 
given the power to chair standing or temporary committees, or are given 
special powers on a committee even if they do not chair the committee. In 
several countries, losing political coalitions chair important legislative 
committees. In Germany, losing political coalitions hold several important 
committee chair positions. The chair positions of these committees are 
allocated based on the percentage of seats held by a political coalition in the 
legislature. If a political party occupies thirty percent of the seats in the 
Bundestag, that party will receive thirty percent of the committee chair 
positions.59 There are other countries—a mix of parliamentary, presidential, 
and semipresidential—which use the same system as Germany and Portugal, 
with a mandatory (legislative rule), fixed, proportional system of government 
in opposition when it comes to committee chair positions.60 In Great Britain, 
 
57.  S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(1). 
58.  One other regime of note is the regime in a growing number of countries providing 
operational and other funding only for losing political coalitions. See Richard S. Katz & Peter 
Mair, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel 
Party, 1 PARTY POL. 5, 17 (1995) (“Access to state subventions is also unaffected; indeed, in 
some systems, such as Ireland and the UK, parties currently in opposition are actually 
accorded a higher level of subvention precisely because they lack the immediate resources of 
parties currently in government.”). 
59.  See NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 16. 
60.  See id. 
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while there is an informal norm of granting losing political coalitions 
committee chair positions, the precise number of committee chair positions 
occupied by the losing political coalition fluctuates based on negotiations, not 
based on the fixed proportional system used by Germany and Portugal (this 
floating allocation of committee chair positions to losing coalitions is also true 
of the system of committee assignments in parliamentary Canada, 
semipresidential Slovakia,61 and presidential Argentina62). Indeed, in the 
current British Parliament, the opposition Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats together hold more committee chair positions than the governing 
Labour Party does.63 
There is a wide variation in the powers that committee chairs exercise, but 
even in the countries with the weakest powers afforded to committee chairs, 
this genre of government in opposition rules can make a major difference. In 
Great Britain, where committee chairs tend to have less power than in other 
democracies,64 the winners’ powers exercised by the member of the opposition 
party chairing the Public Accounts Committee65 has often been quite 
important. In 2005 and 2006, against the wishes of the Labour government of 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Public Accounts Committee, led by 
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Edward Leigh (Con-
 
61.  In Slovakia, the opposition members control the Environment Committee—and thus 
Slovakia’s position on global warming—by holding not just the chair but also a majority 
vote of fifteen to five votes.  
62.  See Mark P. Jones & Wonjae Hwang, Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending 
Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 267, 277 (2005) (stating that 
losing political coalitions occupied twenty-three percent of committee chair positions 
between 1989 and 2003). 
63.  Labour currently holds nine committee chairs, while the Conservatives hold six chairs and 
the Liberal Democrats hold four. See UK Parliament, Parliamentary Committees, Commons 
Select Committees, http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/parliamentary 
_committees16.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
64.  See COLIN PILKINGTON, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN BRITAIN TODAY 183-205 (1997). 
65.  The Public Accounts Committee in the House of Commons has traditionally been chaired 
by a member of the losing political coalition. See Nevil Johnson, Opposition in the British 
Political System, 1997 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 487, 492. That Committee examines “the 
accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public 
expenditure, and [since 1934] of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the 
Committee may think fit.” See UK Parliament, Committee of Public Accounts, 
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/committee_of_public_accounts.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
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Gainsborough),66 commenced a series of investigations into the practices of 
Blair’s Home Office (akin to the American Attorney General) in dealing with 
foreign nationals when they are released from prison, particularly in the case of 
rejected asylum-seekers.67 
Because Leigh and the Public Accounts Committee possessed powers to 
compel the Home Office to provide information, the Blair Government had no 
choice but to cooperate with this Conservative-led investigation. Eventually, 
this investigation uncovered that many foreign nationals denied asylum had 
been improperly released into society and had committed a range of violent 
crimes such as murder or various sexual offenses.68 Because of this 
Conservative-led effort by the Public Accounts Committee, Blair removed one 
of the giants of his party, Charles Clarke, from his position as Home 
Secretary,69 and Clarke’s resignation made Blair and the Labour Party drop 
rapidly in national polls. 
Even when losing political coalitions are not given all of the winners’ 
powers that are associated with chairing an entire legislative committee, they 
are still sometimes given specific, discrete winners’ powers afforded to 
legislative committees. In the American Congress, there is the Seven Member 
Rule referenced earlier. In several countries, in a system modeled after a series 
of rules in the German Bundestag, committee minorities have even broader 
winners’ powers; losing political coalitions have ‘One-Fourth Powers’ and 
‘One-Third Powers.’ One-fourth of the members on any Bundestag committee 
may discharge an issue under consideration by the committee and force the 
entire Bundestag to discuss it,70 force hearings on issues,71 and call witnesses to 
such hearings.72 
Losing political coalitions have used these discrete winners’ powers to great 
effect. In 2004, for instance, when the Republicans controlled the presidency 
 
66.  See UK Parliament, Committee of Public Accounts, Members, http:// 
www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/committee_of_public_accounts/committee 
_of_public_accounts_members.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
67.  See MP Dubs Home Office ‘Incompetent,’ BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/uk_politics/4944786.stm. 
68.  See Oliver King et al., Blair Backs Clarke To ‘Put Things Right,’ GUARDIAN, Apr. 26, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329465577-108101,00.html. 
69.  See Clarke Is Fired in Cabinet Purge, BBC NEWS, May 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
uk_politics/4975938.stm. 
70.  See Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag, July 2, 1980, BGBl. I at 1273, last amended 
by Gesetz [G], Feb. 12, 1998, BGBl. I at 428, art. VII, rule 69a(5) (F.R.G.). 
71.  Id. art. VII, Rule 70(1). 
72.  Id. art. VII, Rule 70(2). 
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and both houses of Congress, the senior Democrat on the House Committee 
on Government Reform, Henry Waxman from California, used the Seven 
Member Rule to pressure the Bush Administration to release certain 
information about the cost of the new Medicare prescription program after the 
Administration initially refused to do so.73 The release of these cost estimates 
for the prescription plan caused problems for the Bush Administration, since 
the cost of the plan was much higher than expected. Representative Waxman 
also used the Seven Member Rule on other occasions.74 
Losing political coalitions have also been granted a form of winners’ 
powers by being given the authority to compel information from winning 
coalitions. These winners’ powers can come in the form of an “elite” 
information disclosure law limited to elite political figures,75 or an information 
disclosure law to be utilized by any member of the general public. The most 
prominent form of elite information disclosure law is the “Question Days” 
procedure used in several parliamentary democracies, and most recently 
suggested for the United States by former Republican presidential nominee 
John McCain.76 The Question Days procedure permits losing coalitions to 
compel information about any topic, either in writing or on the floor of the 
legislature; there are also more narrow practices that permit losing political 
coalitions to obtain information about narrower, more specific matters, such as 
 
73.  Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House of Representatives, 
to Tommy G. Thompson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Mar. 2, 2004) (on file 
with author). 
74.  See Waxman v. Evans, No. CV014530LGB(AJWX), 2002 WL 32377615 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 
2002) (deciding that the Bush Administration had an obligation to release certain census 
data), rev’d as moot, 52 F. App’x 84 (9th Cir. 2002 ). Importantly, the district court in this 
case rejected any notion that the Seven Member Rule presented a nonjusticiable political 
question. Id. at *3-4. 
75.  The Seven Member Rule, mentioned earlier, supra note 51, functions as a form of elite 
information disclosure law, permitting losing political coalitions—not the general public—
to compel information from executive agencies. The general public has its own Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), but in many important respects FOIA does not sweep as broadly as 
the Seven Member Rule. For instance, the Seven Member Rule states that “[a]n [e]xecutive 
agency . . . shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the committee.” 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (2006) (emphasis added). By contrast, FOIA 
includes a list of exceptions to its disclosure requirements. See id. § 552(b). 
76.  See George F. Will, Op-Ed., McCain’s Question Time, WASH. POST, May 29, 2008, at 19 
(quoting McCain as stating that he “will ask Congress to grant me the privilege of coming 
before both houses to take questions, and address criticism, much the same as the prime 
minister of Great Britain appears regularly before the House of Commons”). Sudha Setty 
has recently written an article advocating the same. See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question 
Time: Power, Information, and the Executive Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247 
(2008). 
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security briefings provided to opposition political candidates.77 In Britain, the 
former leader of the Conservative Party, Michael Howard, used the Question 
Days procedure during the years preceding the 2006 national election to great 
effect, including in July 2004 when he requested information about Blair’s 
education policies that led to Blair having to admit that his policies were a 
“scandal.”78 The British media quickly noted that this admission was a victory 
for Howard, made possible by his usage of the Question Days procedure.79 
In addition to controlling all or part of the operations of a particular 
committee, losing political coalitions sometimes exercise the winners’ powers 
that go along with controlling the operations of the entire legislative body. In 
Canada, the chief opposition party is granted control of the House of 
Commons for twenty days a year.80 The opposition receives control of the 
legislature for the same number of days in Great Britain and New Zealand.81 
During these days when the minority controls the legislature—called either 
“Opposition Days” or “Supply Days”—the losing political coalition is able to 
overrule or defeat motions or items put forward by the winning coalition, and 
to control the debate in the legislature.82 
2. Executive Government in Opposition 
Because of an increasingly common series of institutional changes, losing 
political coalitions also exercise winners’ powers in the executive branch, while 
maintaining their identity as active members of the losing political coalition. In 
South Africa, the Interim Constitution of 1993 guaranteed executive positions 
for members of losing political coalitions. If a political party received at least 
 
77.  In New Zealand, for instance, the Security Intelligence Service is mandated to brief the 
leader of the losing coalition as well as the Prime Minister, providing information about 
national security and other threats. See DEP’T OF THE PRIME MINISTER & CABINET,  
SECURING OUR NATION’S SAFETY (2000), http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/ 
securingoursafety/sis.html. A similar system has been followed in the United States with 
minority members of certain committees in Congress and with presidential candidates. See 
Eric Lipton, Security Briefings for the Other Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A12. 
78.  423 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 831-33. 
79.  See Blair Admits Schools Literacy ‘Scandal,’ DAILY MAIL, July 7, 2004, http:// 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-309438/Blair-admits-schools-literacy-scandal.html. 
80.  Inside Canada’s Parliament: The Institution, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Information/library/ 
inside/institutions-e.htm#role (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
81.  See AUTH. OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 18 
(2007), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmstords/105/ 
105.pdf. 
82.  See Inside Canada’s Parliament: The Institution, supra note 80. 
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eighty seats in the National Assembly—meaning at least twenty percent of the 
seats of the 400-member National Assembly83—then it was guaranteed to have 
a member of the party appointed as Executive Deputy President.84 The 
Executive Deputy President had many powers, including working with the 
President of South Africa regarding “the development and execution of the 
policies of the national government,”85 making decisions about cabinet 
appointments,86 and even presiding over Cabinet meetings if the President so 
directed.87 
During the first election held after the interim constitution went into force, 
two parties won at least eighty seats—the African National Congress (ANC), 
led by Nelson Mandela, and the National Party (NP), led by F.W. de Klerk 
(the ANC won 252 seats in the National Assembly,88 and the National Party 
captured 82 seats89). This meant that the government of South Africa featured 
one Executive Deputy President put forward by the ANC (Thabo Mbeki) and 
one Executive Deputy President put forward by the National Party (F.W. de 
Klerk). While Mbeki followed the policies of his fellow ANC member 
Mandela, de Klerk used his powers as Executive Deputy President to push 
policies contrary to what Mandela and his overwhelming ANC majority 
wanted,90 in particular, policies related to questions about “language rights, 
education and affirmative action in the civil service and elsewhere.”91 Beyond 
South Africa’s regime under the 1993 Interim Constitution, other countries—
including most notably Austria, Colombia, Great Britain, and Italy—have at 
various times required, either by law or by informal norm, that members of 
 
83.  See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 40(1). 
84.  Id. art. 84 (“Every party holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly shall be entitled 
to designate an Executive Deputy President from among the members of the National 
Assembly.”). 
85.  Id. art. 82(2). 
86.  Id. art. 88. 
87.  Id. art. 89. 
88.  See Bill Keller, The Overview; South Africans Hail President Mandela; First Black Leader Pledges 
Racial Unity, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at 1. 
89.  Alexander Johnston, South Africa: The Election and the Emerging Party System, 70 INT’L AFF. 
721, 729 (1994). 
90.  The interim South African Constitution also provided that the heads of cabinet departments 
were to be allocated in proportion to the number of seats held by a particular political party 
in the National Assembly, the South African legislature. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 
art. 88(2). 
91.  J.E. Spence, Opposition in South Africa, 32 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 522, 534 (1997). 
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losing political coalitions exercise executive government in opposition winners’ 
powers. 
These examples of executive government in opposition are highly 
consequential, because cabinet ministers in parliamentary and presidential 
systems exercise substantial authority. In parliamentary systems, “only the 
minister in charge of the relevant department is in a position to present [a] 
policy proposal at cabinet, giving him or her a privileged position in the policy 
area in question.”92 In presidential or semipresidential systems, as well as in 
parliamentary systems, members of the winning coalition are often too busy or 
otherwise disinclined to overrule or interrupt the actions of the losing political 
coalition exercising winners’ powers. Simply put, “a high workload, coupled 
with the relatively small size of the cabinet and policy specialization by 
ministers, means that the precise content and wording of a bill are usually 
decided by the cabinet minister under whose jurisdiction a bill falls.”93 If that 
cabinet minister is from the losing political coalition, then, that means that 
they do more than propose law to the chief executive; they actually make law, 
on their own and most of the time.  
These systems of executive government in opposition need to be 
distinguished from coalition or nonpartisan forms of executive government, 
where there are political figures originally from losing political coalitions 
exercising executive winners’ powers, but where these political figures have one 
way or another forsaken or at least compromised their identity as oppositional 
political leaders. For instance, there are many examples of previously 
oppositional partisan figures occupying executive positions as something 
which might be called a nonpartisan trustee. In Switzerland, for instance, the 
representatives from the four main political parties who hold executive 
positions pursuant to the Zauberformel, mentioned earlier, generally forsake 
their partisan identity while in office. It is a conventional norm in Switzerland, 
then, that “members of the Federal Council are expected on election to 
renounce all formal ties to their parties and any interest groups.”94 Things have 
 
92.  See MICHAEL GALLAGHER, MICHAEL LAVER & PETER MAIR, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN 
MODERN EUROPE 56 (3d ed. 2001). 
93.  See Lanny W. Martin & Georg Vanberg, Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and 
Parliamentary Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 13, 14 (2004); see also id. at 13 (“Coalition 
government ordinarily requires delegation of important policymaking powers to the 
ministers who control different portfolios. In other words, a collection of actors (the 
coalition partners, as represented in the cabinet) with preferences that diverge on at least 
some issues must delegate power to individuals (the ministers) who are associated with a 
particular party.”). 
94.  Thomas A. Baylis, Collegial Leadership in Advanced Industrial Societies: The Relevance of the 
Swiss Experience, 13 POLITY 33, 42 (1980). 
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operated in a similar manner in the United States, where Republican American 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen abandoned partisan politics when he 
joined the cabinet of Democratic President Bill Clinton, and current Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates (appointed by President Bush and retained by 
President Obama) is not a registered Republican in the first place.95 
While members of the Swiss cabinet do not represent examples of 
government in opposition because they forsake their partisan identity, coalition 
governments are not examples of pure government in opposition because 
political leaders join the government in coalition governments by 
compromising—even if not completely forsaking—their partisan identities. 
Consider, for instance, the situation in parliamentary Israel after the last 
national election in 2006.96 The party receiving the most votes was the Kadima 
Party, led by incumbent Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, which received 29 
seats out of 120 seats in the Israel Knesset.97 That meant that Prime Minister 
Olmert needed to find other parties to join his coalition so that he could 
achieve a working majority in the Israeli Knesset. Eventually, Olmert reached 
an agreement with his chief opponents in the 2006 election, the Labour Party, 
who received nineteen seats.98 This meant that Labour Leaders Amir Peretz 
and now (former Labour Prime Minister) Ehud Barak occupied the important 
position of Defense Minister in the Kadima/Olmert Government.99 
Barak, then, was both leader of the Labour Party and Defense Minister, and 
this would seemingly involve a check on Olmert by a member of a losing 
political coalition rather than by a member of a winning political coalition. But, 
 
95.  See Robert Gates, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1863939,00.html 
(last visited Sep. 29, 2009). 
96.  Israel enacted a law in 1992 that provided that the Prime Minister was to be elected directly 
by the citizens, but that the Prime Minister could be removed by an absolute majority vote 
of the Knesset. See Gideon Rahat, The Study of the Politics of Electoral Reform in the 1990s: 
Theoretical and Methodological Lessons, 36 COMP. POL. 461, 462 (2004). In 2003, it changed 
the law back to give it a traditional parliamentary system, instead of a directly elected Prime 
Minister. See id. 
97.  See Greg Myre, Premier-Elect in Israel Closer to a Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A8. 
98.  Id. Prime Minister Olmert also included within his coalition the Pensioners’ Party (seven 
seats), and the Shas Party (thirteen seats). See Jonathan Ferziger, Olmert Savvy  
Keeps Coalition Intact as He Seeks Peace, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 16, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=atvaMmPk7ZtY&refer=home.  
99.  See Isabel Kershner, Ex-Premier of Israel Takes Helm of Labor Party, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 
2007, at A19. There are other recent and prominent examples of chief figures from the 
political opposition occupying prominent positions in the cabinet of another party. In 
Germany, Joshka Fischer, leader of the Green Party, was (Social Democratic) Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder’s Foreign Minister during the time when Germany had to decide about 
its policies toward American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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by becoming Defense Minister as part of the Olmert coalition, Barak is not 
exercising government in opposition power. Even though Barak maintains his 
position as Labour Leader, he still sacrifices some of his opposition bona fides 
by joining Olmert and his government, and in many ways acts at the behest of 
Olmert and Kadima, since he is part of the Kadima Government. He was 
obliged to support the Kadima Government of Olmert, or otherwise resign his 
cabinet position—which Barak would be loath to do, given the importance of 
his cabinet position and given the risks presented by being out of government. 
3. Judicial Government in Opposition 
Government in opposition rules also exist for courts and the judicial 
branch. These judicial government in opposition rules extend not only to the 
appointment of individuals to the courts in the first place, but also to the 
operation of these courts. Some rules permit losing political coalitions the 
power to appoint judges to the bench. Other rules permit judges appointed by 
losing political coalitions the power to decide cases as majorities, or grant 
losing political coalitions special powers to compel and command the resources 
of the judicial branch. 
About a dozen countries have adopted rules that guarantee members of 
losing political coalitions the ability to appoint judges to courts. In Germany, 
discussed briefly earlier, for instance, by informal agreement there is a “norm 
of reciprocity that has established de facto party seats held by the three major 
parties.”100 A similar system exists in other countries, such as Portugal and 
Spain.101 The blue slip procedure in the United States Senate also creates a 
system that permits senators from losing political coalitions informally to 
nominate judges, although the President formally has to nominate them.102 
 
100.  TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTION COURTS IN ASIAN 
CASES 45 (2003). 
101.  See Sofia Amaral Garcia, Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, Judicial Independence and Party 
Politics in the Kelsenian Constituitonal Courts: The Case of Portugal 4-5 (Ill. L. & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE 08-021, 2008).  
102.  The blue slip procedure occurs when a senator from the potential or actual nominee’s home 
state objects to the nomination. See Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”: Enforcing the 
Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 76 (2001). This 
procedure can occur both before and after an actual nomination is submitted to the Senate. 
See Memorandum from Senate Judiciary Comm. Staff to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, 
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 22, 1979), in Selection and Confirmation of Federal 
Judges: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part I, 96th Cong. 131 (1979). If the blue 
slip procedure is utilized after the nomination is submitted, and the home state senator 
obstructs the nomination, we might see it more as the exercise of losers’ powers. If it 
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Losing political coalitions are not only sometimes given, informally, the 
power to appoint judges, but also sometimes given special power to command 
the resources of a court by being given standing to bring lawsuits through 
generally applicable rules that permit losing groups to bring lawsuits. In the 
United States, regardless of the winning or losing identity of a political figure 
or group bringing a lawsuit, they still must prove that they have suffered some 
sort of tangible, concrete harm.103 In several countries, losing political 
coalitions are granted virtual automatic standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of statutes. In Austria, for instance, there is no need for a 
tangible harm to have occurred; one-third of the members of the House of 
Representatives or the Senate may file challenges against federal statutes, and 
one-third may file challenges against state statutes.104 The percentages go even 
lower in some places; in Portugal, before the promulgation of a statute, one-
fifth of the members of the Assembly can bring a challenge,105 and after 
promulgation one-tenth of the members of the Assembly can.106 
Once lawsuits make their way into court, judges appointed by or affiliated 
with losing political coalitions might sometimes not just be on the panel, but 
might actually constitute the voting majority on the court for certain matters, 
through rules that permit but do not encourage or mandate government in 
opposition results. In the United States, since a single district court judge 
usually decides a case at the federal district level, at some point in time that 
federal district court judge will have been appointed by a party different from 
the party in power, and indeed even a party different from the party that 
dominates the federal bench at the time.107 At the federal appellate level, since 
 
transpires before the nomination is submitted, and as part of the decision to nominate, it 
seems more like the exercise of winners’ powers by the home state senator (assuming, of 
course, that the home state senator is not a member of the winning coalition). 
103.  The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III of the American Constitution to mean that 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that there has been an “injury in fact,” that this injury can be 
traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and that a judicial decision will remedy this 
injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
104.  See Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1930, as last amended by 
Bundesgesetz [BG] BGBl I No. 100/2003, art. 140, ¶ 1 (Austria). See generally Victor Ferreres 
Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some 
Thoughts on Judicial Activism, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (2004) (discussing issues related to the 
structure of constitutional courts). 
105.  Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1930, as last amended by 
Bundesgesetz [BG] BGBl I No. 100/2003, art. 278 (Austria).  
106.  Id. art. 281. 
107.  One notable example of this happened, for instance, when Judge Anna Diggs Taylor of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, appointed by President 
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three judges have always decided cases—and since 1911, three judges from the 
appellate court and not from the district court—there is the possibility that two 
or three judges of the minority party could be deciding the case.108 
Of course, though, these accidental and random judicial government in 
opposition panels are merely defaults, and can be overturned in various ways. 
If a district court judge of one party issues a decision, it can be appealed to the 
federal court of appeals, where a three-judge panel possibly consisting of 
members of the majority party can overrule the decision. A decision by a three-
judge panel of the federal appellate court can be overturned by an en banc panel 
of the whole court, which is much more likely to be composed by a majority of 
majority party members. Finally, of course, these decisions can all be appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
i i i .  the normative benefits of government in opposition 
rules 
As the previous Parts have discussed, government in opposition rules 
represent a distinctive approach to structuring the separation of powers in 
democratic systems. This Part will discuss the merits of government in 
opposition rules, which are substantial. Government in opposition rules can 
add much to all varieties of constitutional systems—from parliamentary to 
semipresidential and presidential regimes—and to countries at all different 
stages of maturity of their constitutional systems, from nascent, fragile 
democracies to secure, established democracies. The most notable benefit of 
government in opposition rules is that they provide the most effective—and 
permanent—constraint on power of any separation of powers regime that 
constitutions have ever contemplated. For all kinds of democracies, this means 
there are limitations on how much power can be granted to a particular 
political figure or political coalition. Government in opposition rules prevent 
excesses of power, because even if a political movement wins all different kinds 
of elections for all different kinds of positions, they still do not control all of the 
winners’ powers. 
But this logic of constraint and restraint on power is only part of what 
government in opposition rules can offer constitutional democracies. 
Permitting losing political coalitions to exercise the power to govern 
 
Jimmy Carter, decided that President George W. Bush’s wiretapping program was 
unconstitutional. See ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
108.  See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS 
OF APPEALS 234 (1994). 
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encourages a broader range of perspectives to be aired in the political process, 
and in a more meaningful way, ensuring a more robust version of 
representative democracy. This role for losing political coalitions contributes to 
both the stability and the legitimacy of the constitutional order; with many 
voices being heard—and, more than that, many voices having their sentiments 
become binding law—members of many different political movements 
subscribe to some of the tenets of the democratic system. And, because of this 
perceived legitimacy and because this legitimacy stems from experience 
governing, more political movements are ready to lead if power switches 
hands; more political movements have experience exercising (winners’) power; 
and, as a result, campaigns themselves become more substantive, changing the 
nature of discourse in a democracy. 
A. The Benefits of Government in Opposition Rules 
1. The Constructive Winner: The Illiberal Democrat and Permanent 
Constraint 
As mentioned earlier, one of the key questions that constitutional designers 
attempt to answer, as Bruce Ackerman has put it, is how many elections 
political movements need to win before assuming “full authority.”109 In 
parliamentary systems, a political movement need only win one election before 
assuming full authority. In presidential and semipresidential systems, a 
political movement must succeed in several elections before assuming full 
authority, and these several elections are for different forms of political office. 
But all of these systems share the same feature: if a political movement is 
successful enough, and convinces enough voters over a long enough period of 
time, it can control all or almost all of the institutions exercising winners’ 
powers. There will be some slack, because there might still be winner-related 
institutions or even purely bureaucratic institutions using winners’ powers in 
contravention of how the political movement wants. But, at the end of the day, 
if the political movement is successful enough, it will achieve complete or at 
least hegemonic control of the all-valuable winners’ powers. 
It might be the case that some political figures, even after achieving this 
amount of control of winners’ powers, would exercise this complete power in a 
positive fashion. If this political movement in control of this amount of 
winners’ powers uses its electoral or political mandates to assume excessive 
 
109.  Ackerman, supra note 5, at 648. 
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power, though, that movement’s leader has become an “illiberal democrat.”110 
In such a situation, decisions are made without a full range of information and 
perspectives being considered; so, for instance, after taking control of all 
winners’ powers, Prime Minister Blair supported the American efforts in Iraq 
without considering the full range of concerns that other leaders—from the 
Conservative party primarily—had been voicing. The rights of minorities were 
suppressed by the American Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) after he had 
taken control over all of the winners’ powers available in the American federal 
system (so, for instance, FDR ordered the internment of Japanese-Americans). 
In a more fragile democracy like Russia, the menace of the illiberal democrat in 
control of all winners’ powers like Putin poses a threat to the very existence of 
the democratic state, leading to a situation where major presidential candidates 
were not permitted on the ballot (like chess star Garry Kasparov111). 
One system for preventing a hugely successful political coalition from 
going to excess, mentioned earlier, is the idea of creating multiple winners, 
each with control of their own institutions or parts of institutions, and thus 
their own sets of winners’ powers. The first problem with this arrangement is 
that once a political movement becomes successful enough, any set of winners’ 
powers that can be captured by democratic elections will be captured by the 
very successful political movement. A related problem arises as a result of the 
strategy of trying to constrain the illiberal democrat and their complete control 
of winners’ powers by creating losers’ powers. Simply put, the more powerful 
the illiberal democrat becomes, the more that leader can cut back and ignore 
losers’ powers, because controlling all of the winners’ powers means that the 
winning political coalition has complete control over the “purse and the 
sword”112 that provide the hard power institutional support for the exercise of 
losers’ powers. Losing political coalitions, without a coercive set of winners’ 
powers behind them, do not have their own armies, their own courts, or their 
own legislative committees to provide the muscle to support their losers’ 
powers and pose a real constraint on the exercise of winners’ powers by an 
unconstrained illiberal democrat. 
 
110.  As mentioned before, I borrow this phrase and concept from Fareed Zakaria, among others. 
See supra note 9. 
111.  See Andrew E. Kramer, Kasparov Says He Was Forced To End Bid for Presidency, N.Y. TIMES 
Dec. 13, 2007, at A18. 
112.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 302 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001) (“The executive not only dispenses the honours, but holds the sword 
of the community; the legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by 
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated . . . .”). 
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Another institutional strategy that has been used to attempt to constrain 
the illiberal democrat is not to create more elections resulting in the greater 
dispersion of winners’ powers, but to immunize institutions exercising 
winners’ powers from the ambit of democratic oversight. This is, to some 
degree, what constitutional courts were created to do, as James Madison 
argued in The Federalist Papers.113 But even constitutional courts themselves are 
creatures of democratic politics, since their judges are appointed by elected 
figures, and so it is precisely a figure like an illiberal democrat who might try to 
exert greater influence over courts. FDR’s court-packing plan is a failed 
example of this,114 but there are even better examples of successful efforts to 
dominate courts through appointments from a political movement, such as 
President Carlos Menem’s efforts to control the Supreme Court in Argentina.115 
Other institutions removed from the control of winning coalitions, such as civil 
service-dominated bureaucratic institutions, might temporarily constrain 
illiberal democrats, but even they can do only so much to constrain a hugely 
successful political coalition—without the hard power and political base that 
the illiberal democrat and his or her control of winners’ powers has. 
If all of the other institutional mechanisms of constraint fail to constrain 
the electorally successful—but illiberal—democratic leader, then government in 
opposition rules represent the best solution, because they always draw a line of 
constraint beyond which the illiberal democrat cannot operate. No matter how 
many elections the dominant political movement wins, and no matter how 
much the dominant political movement comes to control winners’ powers, it 
does not exercise complete control over the entirety of winners’ powers. In this 
way, government in opposition prevents unconstrained winners from 
overreaching, and from even overthrowing democratic systems entirely. Rather 
than creating the possibility of winners’ powers being controlled by several 
 
113.  See id. at 403. (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a 
limited constitution.”). 
114.  See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 
1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347. 
115.  Menem succeeded where FDR failed and enlarged the size of the Supreme Court of 
Argentina from five to nine Justices—and when one remaining Justice resigned, he was able 
to appoint a majority of members of the Court. See HORACIO VERBITSKY, HACER LA CORTE: 
LA CONSTRUCCION DE UN PODER ABSOLUTO SIN JUSTICIA NI CONTROL 67 (1993). This was 
not the first time that the government of Argentina had decided to alter significantly the 
composition of the Court. See Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-
Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 291, 
292 (2002) (“[T]he Court was replaced en masse by the military following the coup in 1976 
and again by the incoming democratic government of Raul Alfonsin in 1983.”). 
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different coalitions, at least some forms of government in opposition rules 
(mandatory rules) make this a requirement. 
Government in opposition rules constrain the excess of the illiberal 
democrat in two ways. First, being in the minority when it comes to some 
decisions might especially sensitize majorities to the concerns of minorities.116 
We can call this rationale for government in opposition rules the “responsible 
winner” rationale.117 In other words, government in opposition rules foster 
more responsive and responsible winning coalitions, and this is one way such 
rules remedy the problem of the unconstrained winner. The illiberal democrat 
will have incentives not to overstep, because even the illiberal democrat will 
have to be in the minority on occasion, and will want to be treated fairly. 
In the context of government in opposition rules, imagine, for instance, if, 
while he was still in power, President Vladimir Putin of Russia was forced to 
deal with a Foreign Minister Garry Kasparov, from a leading opposition party. 
That would mean that Foreign Minister Kasparov would be making key 
foreign policy decisions. President Putin would have had to be careful about 
how dismissive he was of Kasparov’s United Civil Front political party, because 
even though President Putin could formally overrule Kasparov’s activities as 
Foreign Minister, Kasparov would most of the time be making final foreign 
policy decisions, and no matter what, it would be difficult and politically costly 
for Putin to constantly overrule Kasparov’s decisions. 
The responsible winner scenario envisions that, because of the winning 
coalitions’ powers exercised by losing coalitions, winning coalitions will act 
more responsibly so that losing coalitions use their winners’ powers more 
responsibly as well. In other words, it assumes a certain longitudinal 
consciousness and assessment of interests on the parts of winners—knowing 
that they control most winners’ powers, but aware that if they use those 
powers equitably, at some hypothetical point down the line losing coalitions 
might also use their (fewer) winners’ powers more responsibly. But there will 
be many situations in which political coalitions might not keep this reciprocity 
concern in mind, and so might act to excess. This might be even truer in the 
 
116.  See Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 2, at 1146 (noting how “second-order 
diversity” might have this characteristic). 
117.  The “responsible winner” rationale for government in opposition rules is similar to the 
situations that Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule discussed when the President of the United 
States wants to indicate that he or she has the best of intentions. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 867 (2007) (“[T]he [executive] 
credibility dilemma can be addressed by executive signaling. Without any new 
constitutional amendments, statutes, or legislative action, law and executive practice already 
contain resources to allow a well-motivated executive to send a credible signal of his 
motivations, committing to use increased discretion in public-spirited ways.”). 
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case of the illiberal democrat, a political figure who has achieved such electoral 
success that constraints on power might be fewer and farther between, and his 
assumptions about the scope of his power might be exaggerated. In this 
situation, government in opposition rules do not dissuade the illiberal 
democrat from acting to excess because of an enlightened, longitudinal sense of 
self-interest, but rather because these rules directly block the illiberal democrat 
from acting to excess when the illiberal democrat affirmatively and aggressively 
tries to act to excess. In these situations, rather than relying on the restraint of 
winning coalitions, government in opposition rules constrain by relying on the 
affirmative actions of losing coalitions blocking the actions of winning 
coalitions.  
Of course, there is instability, or what Adrian Vermeule has called 
“reversibility”118 problems with this situation—meaning that, since the illiberal 
democrat is the political majority, with some extra effort he can always 
overturn this exercise of winners’ powers by the losing political coalition. But 
the public will become accustomed to the status quo created by the exercise of 
winners’ powers by losing political coalitions.119 Some exercises of winners’ 
powers by losing coalitions, such as those releasing damaging information to 
the public, are irreversible.120 Simply by holding hearings and releasing 
documentary information into the public domain that sensationalized the 
British body politic,121 MP Leigh and his Public Accounts Committee had done 
damage to the Blair Government that it could not undo, regardless of what 
committee it assigned its deportation bill to or what chair it might have 
replaced to appoint Leigh on the Public Accounts Committee. Norms might 
also develop that it is unfair to overrule the exercise of winners’ powers by 
losing coalitions.122 So, when losing coalitions use winners’ powers to block 
winning coalitions, it is not perfectly stable, but it is largely stable. 
 
118.  See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 89 (“[S]ubmajoritarian decisions are exposed to reversal by 
subsequent majorities, and might thus be chronically unstable.”). 
119.  See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228-
29 (2003) (“[I]ndividuals tend to prefer the present state of the world to alternative states, 
all other things being equal.”). 
120.  Adrian Vermeule makes this point about transparency decisions that can be made by 
submajorities. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 91 (“Once published, perhaps by a 
submajoritarian decision, the information circulates beyond the power of subsequent 
majorities to suppress, whether or not they possess legal authority to do so.”). 
121.  See MP Dubs Home Office ‘Incompetent,’ supra note 67.  
122.  For a good example of this, consider how a majority of five on the U.S. Supreme Court 
hardly ever votes to reject a petition that the Rule of Four permits four Justices on the Court 
to decide to hear. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 296 (8th ed. 
2002). 
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One of the normative points of this Section—that government in 
opposition rules are normatively desirable because they constrain illiberal 
democrats better than other mechanisms of constraint—relates to a descriptive 
and explanatory point that I am working on in other projects. One of the main 
reasons why these rules were created in the first place was because of a 
particular historical dynamic where political figures feared they might be in the 
minority and were looking for rules to constrain those in the majority. MP 
Edward Short, the aforementioned Member of Parliament responsible for 
creating systematic government in opposition in Great Britain, proposed his 
system because “no other system will prevent a Prime Minister from going too 
far better than this.”123 Short believed that government in opposition rules were 
better, if not at least as good, at protecting losing political coalitions as judicial 
review. 
Given these explanations for the constraining role of government in 
opposition rules—and the fact that Short and others relied on these reasons in 
proposing these rules—it should not be surprising that several large-N studies 
have demonstrated that power-sharing regimes actually do promote regime 
stability in a range of countries because of the manner in which they restrain 
illiberal democrats.124 There is good reason to believe that power-sharing 
regimes limited to government in opposition rules, though, in particular promote 
stability. For instance, the idea of the mutual veto, also included in Lijphart’s 
definition of consociationalism,125 has created antagonism between rival 
political and other factions in many countries and created excessive stalemate. 
Government in opposition rules give losing political coalitions some winners’ 
powers, but, ultimately, the winning political coalition can push an initiative 
through if it so desires. The mutual veto, by contrast, essentially gives winning 
and losing political coalition joint winners’ powers related to major issues,126 
and therefore the mutual veto makes it almost impossible for the winning 
coalition to push through actions unless it changes the existing constitutional 
order. For instance, the presence of mutual vetoes, utilized related to important 
matters by both Turkish and Greek groups to cause paralysis and stalemate, is 
 
123.  See 312 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1964) 831-32.  
124.  See Pippa Norris, Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, 
Electoral Systems, and Democratization, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 206 (Andrew 
Reynolds ed., 2002). 
125.  See LIJPHART, supra note 40, at 25. 
126.  These joint winners’ powers apply to particularly controversial areas of policy, such as 
foreign affairs and security policies. See H. IBRAHIM SALIH, CYPRUS: ETHNIC POLITICAL 
COUNTERPOINTS 3 (2004). 
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what ultimately destroyed the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus and its government 
in opposition—but also mutual veto—rules.127 
Power-sharing regimes, in general, have simply worked much better when 
there was integration and not segregation. Government in opposition rules, on 
their own, do not give losing political coalitions fiefdoms where they can hide 
from winning political coalitions. But a mutual veto and segmental autonomy 
create precisely that situation, and give significant winners’ powers to 
individuals and groups simply by their ability to join a group and not integrate 
with other coalitions. It is not surprising, then, that some studies show 
government in opposition rules joined together with politically and culturally 
isolationist devices like mutual vetoes have intensified political cleavages.128 
Nor is it surprising that systems that have integrated groups by using 
government in opposition rules, but not segregated them in other ways, have 
worked better.129 
Likewise, another one of the modalities of power-sharing that Lijphart has 
grouped under the rubric of power-sharing regimes is the idea of segmental 
autonomy, which means that political minorities 
rule . . . in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern. While matters 
of mutual concern are to be resolved by joint agreement reached 
through the mechanisms of coalition, veto and proportionality, matters 
of particular concern are to be resolved by delegating authority to the 
individual segments. In this way, segmental autonomy removes 
sensitive and potentially destabilizing issues from the larger political 
arena.130  
 
127.  See Philippos K. Savvides, Cyprus: The Dynamics of Partition 23-25 (Feb 9, 2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
kokkalis/GSW2/Savvides.PDF. 
128.  For two studies making this point about power-sharing regimes in Northern Ireland, see 
Joanne Hughes & Caitlin Donnelly, Community Relations in Northern Ireland: A Shift in 
Attitudes?, 29 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 643 (2003); and James Tilley, Geoffrey Evans & 
Claire Mitchell, Consociationalism and the Evolution of Political Cleavages in Northern Ireland, 
1989-2004, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 699, 704 (2008). 
129.  See Robert H. Dix, Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia, 12 COMP. POL. 303, 311 
(1980) (“In most communities of any size, there tends to be a mix of Liberals and 
Conservatives, and partisan allegiances do not prevent regular interaction. Such interaction 
is especially notable at the elite level, where most elite clubs and interest associations are 
either by inadvertence or by design bipartisan in nature.”) (internal citations omitted). 
130.  Edmund A. Aunger, Dispersed Minorities and Segmental Autonomy: French-Language School 
Boards in Canada, 2 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 191, 191 (1996). 
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But segmental autonomy creates precisely the same problems as mutual 
vetoes: by separating out power and creating separate enclaves for its exercise, 
there is again the potential for more conflict and stalemate. For these reasons, 
while power-sharing regimes make sense, limiting these regimes to 
government in opposition rules in particular makes sense. 
2. The Constructive Loser: Legitimacy and Readiness 
The previous Subsection discussed how government in opposition rules 
create more constrained—and hence more constructive—winning political 
coalitions, particularly when these winning political coalitions become 
massively successful in winning elections of all kinds at all levels. But 
government in opposition rules also have normative benefits because they 
result in a more attractive role for losing political coalitions. Government in 
opposition rules expand the genre of formal powers granted to losing political 
coalitions by also providing them with winners’ powers. Granting these 
additional powers to losing political coalitions, though, does much more than 
add to their formal repertoire of powers; it completely reconceives what losing 
political parties do, and for the best. 
First, government in opposition rules compensate for the increasing 
tendency in democratic countries to provide winning political coalitions with 
so much power that losing political coalitions are nearly powerless. It has long 
been true, as John Stuart Mill wrote, that it is an “essential part of democracy 
that minorities should be adequately represented. . . . [and that n]o real 
democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”131 
One means of doing this is to solidify the place of losing political coalitions qua 
losing political coalitions. In democratic systems without proportional 
representation, losing political coalitions are represented in democratic 
institutions, but not as many political parties are represented as in countries 
with proportional representation.132 Regimes like proportional representation 
ensure that losing political coalitions are even more represented in political 
institutions; protecting losers’ powers like the right to dissent ensures that 
these political coalitions can undertake certain activities as part of their 
representation of losing political coalitions. 
 
131.  JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 157 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1869). 
132.  For instance, in the United States House of Representatives, two political parties are 
represented, the Democratic and Republican Parties, while in the Indian Lok Sabha, thirty-
nine political parties are represented. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING 58-59 (2d ed. 1997). 
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In this way, then, traditional structures of constitutional democracy ensure 
that losing political coalitions are represented, in the more formal sense that 
losing political coalitions occupy elected positions and have at least some 
(albeit losers’) powers that come along with these elected positions. But even 
though losing political coalitions are represented because they have a seat at the 
political table, their power is minimal—and not just because, without 
government in opposition rules, they only exercise losers’ powers. The nature 
of winners exercising winners’ powers has meant that losing political 
coalitions, in many democracies, are increasingly left with fewer and fewer 
opportunities for relevance. Losing political coalitions have a seat at the 
political table, but at best all they can do is listen to the discussion transpiring 
at that table. 
In parliamentary regimes, for instance, it is virtually impossible for 
members of losing political coalitions—even though they are full members of 
legislative bodies—to propose pieces of legislation, and nearly impossible to 
have their proposed legislation enacted. The rules of parliamentary bodies 
ensure this. For example, legislation proposed by the winning political 
coalition in the House of Commons has a ninety-seven percent chance of being 
enacted; legislation proposed by losing political coalitions has a small chance of 
even being considered, and almost zero chance of being enacted.133 This 
dynamic is not limited to Great Britain. In almost all parliamentary 
democracies, losing political coalitions have their initiatives debated and 
enacted a small percentage of the time.134 In presidential or semipresidential 
democracies, the same is true.135 The sum total means “that in more than 50 
percent of all [democratic] countries, governments introduce [and enact] more 
than 90 percent of the bills.”136  
In other words, government in opposition rules ensure a more robust 
version of representation in politics, and hence a more robust version of 
legitimacy for democratic institutions. Advances in institutional rules like 
proportional representation have created more ways for losing political 
coalitions to remain somewhat relevant, but they remain largely marginalized. 
A political coalition losing the parliamentary election in Germany by one vote, 
 
133.  See Richard Rose, British MPs: More Bark than Bite?, in PARLIAMENTS AND 
PARLIAMENTARIANS IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 8, 11 (Ezra N. Suleiman ed., 1986). 
134.  See VALENTINE HERMAN, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, PARLIAMENTS OF THE WORLD: A 
REFERENCE COMPENDIUM 630-37 (1976). 
135.  See Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo & Fernando Limongi, Presidential Power, Legislative 
Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil, 32 COMP. POL. 151, 154-55 (2000). 
136.  See George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289, 304 (1995). 
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for instance, would have close to a zero percent chance of having its legislation 
enacted, while the political coalition that received one vote more would have 
close to a one hundred percent chance of its legislation being enacted. 
Government in opposition rules modify this reality by ensuring greater (actual 
winners’) powers for losing political coalitions. 
Indeed, government in opposition rules might be more than a welcome 
addition to the normative representational benefits that proportional 
representation regimes provide; they might be valuable replacements for 
proportional representation rules. Proportional representation rules have clear 
tendencies to foster gridlock and instability because there are so many parties 
exercising losers’ powers and obstructing governance,137 and also because they 
permit “the inclusion of extreme candidates”138 who do not have to receive as 
many votes as they would without such rules in order to hold a seat in the 
legislature and can challenge the very nature of the constitutional regime. 
Government in opposition rules, depending on their precise design,139 do 
permit a range of interests to be represented in government, but by giving 
these interests winners’ powers as well as losers’ powers, they change the 
incentives for gridlock and for extremism. Because those being represented 
through the exercise of government in opposition powers can be blamed for 
the gridlock in government, and have much to lose from the fall of 
 
137.  See Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is 
Wrong To Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 59-66 (2001); 
see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) (“The 
Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best 
served through a healthy two-party system.”). 
138.  See Issacharoff, supra note 8, at 1419. 
139.  It can be the case that there could be a high burden to meet to qualify to exercise 
government in opposition powers, such as the rule under the interim constitution of South 
Africa that a party had to receive at least twenty percent of the vote in order to be granted an 
executive deputy president position. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(1) (“Every 
party holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an 
Executive Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly.”). The 
1998 settlement in Northern Ireland also featured some significant barriers that had to be 
satisfied before political parties could exercise government in opposition powers. See 
Brendan O’Leary, Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in 
FROM POWER SHARING TO DEMOCRACY: POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTIONS IN ETHNICALLY 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES 3, 14-15 (Sid Noel ed., 2005). These rules can be seen as the analogues to 
the aforementioned rules in some proportional representation systems that require that 
political parties receive a certain minimum percentage of the vote before they qualify for 
seats in the legislature. The contrast, of course, is that some government in opposition rules 
permit virtually any political coalition, no matter how few votes they received, to exercise 
government in opposition powers—think of the rules governing Short Money in the British 
Parliament. 
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government, there are fewer reasons to believe that government in opposition 
rules will cause the problems that proportional representation rules cause,140 
particularly in presidential systems.141 
Not only is there reason to believe that government in opposition rules 
make constitutional systems more normatively desirable because they ensure 
that losing political coalitions occupy more than a hollow seat at the table, but 
this broader and more robust approach to political representation also leads to 
a more stable constitutional system. Constitutional democracies with 
government in opposition rules will be more stable because even losing 
political coalitions have a stake in the basic functionality of the regime. If the 
regime is not working, losing political coalitions can be at least partly to blame, 
and so will suffer political costs; and if the regime is not working, losing 
political coalitions might be willing to take the chance on new or subsequent 
elections (which might result in some continued winners’ powers if they are in 
opposition, but more winners’ powers if they triumph in the election), but not 
on an entirely new constitutional system (because that new system might 
feature dramatically fewer powers for whoever loses elections). 
The role of government in opposition rules does create actual as opposed to 
just theoretical “sociological legitimacy,”142 which should not be surprising 
given the general dynamics of public support for government. When citizens 
believe a political figure with similar positions and politics to their own is not 
just representing them in government but actually exercising winners’ powers, 
their core support for the constitutional system increases. In the United States 
those associated with the Democratic Party are more likely to support the 
 
140.  In Italy, for instance, between 1945 and 1996 the Italian Cabinet lasted an average of 1.28 
years before being replaced by a new coalition of parties. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF 
DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 132 tbl.7.1 
(1999). But, as Bruce Ackerman has stated, many of the problems posed by proportional 
representation rules can be mitigated, if not eliminated, by “the necessary bits of 
constitutional engineering.” Ackerman, supra note 5, at 654. 
141.  See Robert A. Dahl, Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions from Democratic 
Experience, in POLITICAL ORDER: NOMOS XXXVIII, 175, 192 (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin 
eds., 1996) (“Of all the major alternatives, presidentialism with PR—the Latin American 
option—may be the most unstable.”) (emphasis omitted). 
142.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795 
(2005) (“When legitimacy is measured in sociological terms, a constitutional regime, 
governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in a strong sense insofar 
as the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support 
for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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government if the president is a Democrat.143 Likewise, political support is 
highest in multiparty, proportional representation systems, because there are 
the most positions and opportunities for one’s political party to win an election 
and hold the resultant winners’ powers. As a recent article explained it: 
[I]nstitutional mechanisms such as the electoral system and the 
number of parties . . . make losers less distrusting of government in 
proportional democracies. . . . [P]roportional democracies are 
associated not only to electoral rules and coalition and minority 
governments but also to committee parliamentary rules that facilitate 
the influence of the opposition in the policy-making process. This 
implies that even those citizens not ideologically close to any party of 
the coalition government have the capacity to influence the legislative 
process. Under such circumstances, a citizen ideologically far from the 
government coalition will probably consider that the government is 
unable to harm his or her interests and therefore [it] is less probable 
that he or she distrusts the government.144 
Indeed, most of the information we have suggests the kind of support for 
government that increases when one’s party exercises winners’ powers is an 
increase in diffuse support, or support for the basic structural legitimacy of a 
constitutional system.145 This means that government in opposition rules are 
particularly important for more fragile democracies, where an emphasis on 
stability might be warranted. But it also means that at least some parts or some 
amount of these rules might be warranted for more stable democracies, because 
even stable democracies should create institutions that promote their basic 
stability. Even beyond the basic support for the core of the constitutional 
system, other positive elements will be on the rise with this increased support 
for the system that comes with government in opposition rules—turnout and 
 
143.  See John R. Alford, We’re All in this Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1966, 
in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28 (John R. Hibbing & 
Elizabeth Theiss-Moore eds., 2001); Jack Citrin & Samantha Luks, Political Trust Revisited: 
Déjà Vu All Over Again?, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE?, 
supra, at 9. 
144.  See Henar Criado & Francisco Herreros, Political Support: Taking into Account the Institutional 
Context, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 1511, 1516 (2007).  
145.  See DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965) (describing diffuse 
support as a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or 
tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to 
their wants”). 
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involvement in the political system is higher in parts of the United States,146 for 
instance, that feature more parties and more viewpoints included among those 
exercising winners’ powers. 
Another question about how constructive of a role losing political coalitions 
can play in systems with government in opposition rules is what will happen to 
the more ideologically extreme members of the winning coalition. Some will 
join government, exercise winners’ powers, and be happy with that. Others 
will continue their ideological efforts, believing these efforts best waged from 
outside government. But this fact—that members of the losing political 
coalition do not need to join the government to be relevant—is why many of 
the criticisms of Donald Horowitz about whether rules like government in 
opposition rules promote stability are misplaced.147 There still is opposition to 
the government, coming primarily from the exercise of winners’ powers by 
losing coalitions. 
Another reason why losing political coalitions play a more constructive role 
in systems with government in opposition rules is that they help better prepare 
a range of political and bureaucratic officials to exercise winners’ powers and to 
govern. Major elected political figures—and their political assistants and the 
technical bureaucratic officials associated with them—will have experience 
actually running a cabinet agency, a committee, or a court, regardless of which 
political party they identify with and whether that political party is a part of the 
winning or the losing political coalition. Tony Blair, as leader of the Labour 
Party when the Labour Party was in opposition, gained knowledge about how 
Parliament works by managing the seventeen days a year when his party 
controlled the operations of the House of Commons.148 His assistants in the 
Labour Party then learned about the operations of the various cabinet 
ministries, and several of his deputies actually operated these cabinet ministries 
for several days a year, as mentioned earlier.149 
 
146.  See Shaun Bowler, David Brockington & Todd Donovan, Election Systems and Voter Turnout: 
Experiments in the United States, 63 J. POL. 902 (2001). 
147.  Donald Horowitz says that “[t]he grand coalition implies that the model of government and 
opposition is rejected. Consensual democracy replaces majoritarian democracy, and 
opposition is necessarily located inside government.” Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory 
Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 
1216 (2008). 
148.  See AUTH. OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 15 
(2007), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmstords/105/ 
105.pdf. 
149.  See Johnson, supra note 65, at 493-96. 
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The benefits of this experience are obvious. First, in the unlikely and 
unfortunate event of a terrorist attack or any other need to quickly reestablish 
the government, there would be a larger and broader group of trained 
professionals to take control.150 Second, transitions between governments 
would not be so abrupt and inefficient. If the government needed to tackle an 
urgent issue—such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009, or a dangerous war or 
foreign policy crisis—there would not be as much difficulty in shifting from 
one elected government to another. This is because there would already be a 
ready supply of functionaries of the previously losing—and now winning—
political coalition ready to take power from day one. Indeed, it is the fact that 
there are so many government in opposition rules in places like Great Britain 
that permit, right after an election, “a new prime minister [to] replace[] a 
defeated incumbent the very next day.”151 
Finally, although this requires further empirical examination and 
elaboration, giving leaders of the losing political coalition actual experience 
using winners’ powers contributes to more substantive and less personal 
political campaigns. When political figures have a record in government, that 
record becomes the subject of political debate and discussion. 
B. Concerns about Government in Opposition Rules 
1. The Stalemate Tradeoff? 
If government in opposition rules are normatively desirable because, in 
part, they constrain excessive uses of power, they do potentially pose a problem 
based on the flip side of the constraint coin: these rules may constrain 
government too much—and therefore constitutional designers must find the 
proper balance. Excessive constraint can be problematic from a policy and from 
a stability perspective. In both stable and fragile democracies, it might prevent 
important policies from being enacted. In more fragile democracies, the 
possibility of gridlock, stalemate, and inaction can threaten the basic 
 
150.  See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY L.J. 281, 
281 (2003) (“Presidential succession and government continuity suddenly is a hot topic. The 
September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent War Against Terrorism have brought to 
the fore the possibility of a catastrophic terrorist attack . . . killing the president and vice 
president, and destroying Congress and the federal government. This prospect in turn raises 
. . . questions about how to preserve the federal government . . . how to maintain 
governance in the federal system . . . who will . . . assume the executive power under the 
Constitution and how to repopulate the political branches.”). 
151.  Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit in 
America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859, 871 (2007). 
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constitutional order. An effective constitutional system will constrain excessive 
power, but will not prevent useful exercises of power. In other words, might 
government in opposition rules constrain too much and empower too little? 
There are several responses to this concern. First, the number and 
importance of government in opposition rules can be adjusted, depending on 
the country and the situation. Constitutional systems can vary the degree to 
which they can be characterized as government in opposition systems. This 
might mean that government in opposition rules are warranted for systems 
where the concern is with government doing too much, and not too well, and 
where the concern is with an illiberal democrat rather than an already 
constrained winner. In drafting the Interim Constitution of South Africa, there 
were many government in opposition rules, because the constitution was 
created to manage the transition to democracy. In the final Constitution of 
South Africa, there are no obvious government in opposition rules; this is 
because South Africa survived the years when democracy was more at risk of 
being destabilized, and so the need for these rules has dissipated or 
disappeared.152 In stable democracies, like the United States—as will be 
discussed in Part IV—it might make sense to adjust downward the number of 
government in opposition rules when there is divided government, because 
then there are already plenty of checks on power, while when there is unified 
government there will be fewer constraints on power. 
Another manner to adjust government in opposition rules to ensure there is 
not excessive constraint is to limit the number of political coalitions that can 
utilize government in opposition rules. The Interim South African 
Constitution only guaranteed Executive Deputy President positions to political 
coalitions receiving twenty percent of the vote.153 In Britain, political parties 
receive funding as opposition parties only if they have elected at least two 
members to Parliament in the preceding general election, or have elected at 
least one member and received at least 150,000 popular votes overall.154 Just as 
some countries have minimum vote requirements to ensure that there are not 
too many parties represented in the legislature and causing chaos, so too might 
it make sense to limit the number of parties that can benefit from government 
in opposition rules. 
 
152.  See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S 
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 151-55 (2000).  
153.  See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(1) (“Every party holding at least 80 seats in the 
National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President from among 
the members of the National Assembly.”). 
154.  RICHARD KELLY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, SN/PC/1663, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-01663.pdf . 
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In other words, then, government in opposition rules need not be excessive 
sources of constraint because they can be altered or modified. And because 
government in opposition rules are, by definition, rules empowering political 
minorities, they can be changed by the actions of political majorities acting 
within the established rules of the constitutional system, without even 
repealing the government in opposition rule in the first place. If the winning 
coalition does not like what the losing political coalition did with its winners’ 
powers, it can simply redirect a regulation or legislation to ensure that it is 
controlled by the winning coalition. Depending on the legal form that the 
government in opposition rules take, this repeal by simple majority can be 
done with more or less effort. If the government in opposition rule results from 
an informal understanding, then the majority can decide simply to ignore this 
informal understanding if it feels that this informal understanding is overly 
constraining. For example, Blair decided to do away with the informal 
understanding that led to two days of Prime Minister’s Question Time, and 
minority-dominated legislative time, and condensed it into one day of 
minority-dominated Prime Minister’s Question Time. 
All of this, of course, is assuming that government in opposition rules 
stagnate energetic government in the first place, which is an empirically 
debatable assumption, similar to the debate in the political science literature 
about whether divided or unified governments produce more significant 
policies.155 While it might be surprising that major initiatives are enacted in 
regimes with major government in opposition powers, the political dynamics 
of such systems make it less surprising that major legislation is enacted. Voters 
blame any party exercising winners’ powers, even if that party is part of the 
losing coalition exercising fewer winners’ powers, and so parties that are part 
of losing coalitions do have an interest in ensuring that government 
accomplishes something of significance. 
G.B. Powell has found that proportional representation and other similar 
tools contribute to obscure responsibility in voter evaluations of governmental 
performance, and so voters are more willing to blame all parties rather than 
some political parties because all parties are seen as being part of 
 
155.  David Mayhew, in a book that has attracted substantial agreement and disagreement, has 
argued that divided government does not decrease the enactment of major legislation. See 
DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND 
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990, at 178 (1991). For agreement with his findings, see Sarah A. 
Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519 (1999). Even 
after a wave of criticisms, there is at least some consensus that Mayhew’s core finding has 
been empirically validated. See MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 162-66 (2d ed. 
1996). 
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government.156 Indeed, in parliamentary systems, the more complex the 
coalition constituting the government, the less able voters are to blame 
particular political parties and not others, and so the more they blame all 
political parties.157 In other words, then, because they exercise at least some 
winners’ powers, losing political coalitions will be held responsible for the 
failures of government—and so do not have an interest in obstructing 
government to such an extent that it causes the stalemate-driven nightmare of 
the impotent government. Not only do losing political coalitions have a greater 
interest in avoiding excessive gridlock in government in opposition systems 
because they will be held at least partly responsible for the failures of the 
government, but also because the destruction of such systems poses the threat 
of the losing political coalitions losing the winners’ powers that they do have. 
2. Sowing the Seeds of Destruction: The Weimar Problem 
In countries with political parties that do not believe in the fundamental 
tenets of the democratic system, government in opposition rules might 
empower those parties by giving them winners’ powers. A party that believes 
in the destruction of the government, rather than being forced to operate only 
with losers’ powers, would instead be given winners’ powers and a better 
ability to overthrow the government. As mentioned before, this is part of the 
structural explanation of how Adolf Hitler destroyed the constitution of 
Weimar Germany. Hitler’s Nazi Party, when still a minority party (but a part 
of the majority coalition), used the powers granted to several ministries to 
eliminate opposition and eventually repeal the entire Weimar Constitution 
itself.158 
 
156.  See G. BINGHAM POWELL JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN 
AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000). Others have helpfully elaborated on this argument: 
First, in majoritarian systems, where governments have a majority in the 
parliament, power is concentrated and the outcomes are easily attributed to the 
incumbent. In proportional systems, power is dispersed among government, 
opposition parties, and a range of other political institutions, and the outcomes of 
policies are more difficult to attribute. . . . The second mechanism claims that in 
proportional democracies, where power is more dispersed among different 
political groups, the support for institutions by those citizens who are not 
ideologically identified with the incumbent will be higher than in majoritarian 
democracies.  
  Criado & Herreros, supra note 144, at 1516-17.  
157.  See MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS: THE MAJOR WESTERN 
DEMOCRACIES 108-09 (1988). 
158.  A.J. NICHOLS, WEIMAR AND THE RISE OF HITLER 164, 168-69 (4th ed. 2000). 
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We might worry less about these destabilizing parties and this “Weimar 
Problem” in stable democracies. In the United States, antisystem parties never 
posed much of a threat to the constitutional order, and so when we discuss 
government in opposition rules we are really discussing the division of power 
between the Democratic and Republican parties, neither of which promises to 
overthrow the American Constitution. In stable democracies, we can talk about 
the “loyal” opposition.159 In many other stable democracies, there are more 
fringe parties than in the United States—perhaps because of proportional 
representation—but even these fringe parties generally tend not to support 
goals at odds with the fundamental tenets of the democratic system.160 Parties 
that might be seen as ideologically extreme are still sympathetic enough to the 
basic goals of democratic systems that they can be incorporated into governing 
coalitions. On the right, the Italian National Alliance and the Dutch Pim 
Fortuyn List have joined winning coalitions; on the left, the German Green 
Party has joined the coalition government of the Social Democrats.161 
This, therefore, is more a concern about fragile democracies, and whether 
government in opposition rules undermine the core stability of these new 
democracies. If government in opposition rules do actually present the 
possibility of creating the “Weimar Problem,” there are institutional design 
responses. One common institutional design response to this problem of 
political parties abusing government in opposition rules in order to overthrow 
governments is simply to prevent such political parties from operating in the 
first place. This so-called “militant democracy” approach—which is used in 
many countries and was discussed very recently by Samuel Issacharoff in his 
Harvard Law Review article on the subject162—prevents political parties from 
operating if they do not believe in certain basic tenets of the democratic system. 
This conditions approach is used in the government in opposition context 
as well. In Britain, the money allocated to support the activities of opposition 
parties requires the taking of an oath, which states as follows: “I . . . swear by 
Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth, her heirs and successors, according to law. So help me 
God.”163 
 
159.  See MARY DURKIN & OONAGH GAY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, HER MAJESTY’S 
OPPOSITION, SN/PC/3910, at 2 (Feb. 8, 2006). 
160.  See Peter Mair, The Challenge to Party Government, 31 W. EUR. POL. 211, 212-13 (2008). 
161.  Id. 
162.  See Issacharoff, supra note 8. 
163.  See CHRIS SEAR, PARLIAMENT & CONSTITUTION CTR, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, THE 
PARLIAMENTARY OATH, (Research Paper 01/116, 2001), available at http:// 
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-116.pdf. 
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Rather than just being a meaningless formality, this technique of 
constraining what sorts of parties could be seated (and therefore could receive 
Short Money) has been controversial over the years. The Irish nationalist party 
Sinn Fein has often elected members of Parliament, but its members of 
Parliament have refused to take this oath, and therefore have never received 
Short Money.164 The House of Commons has appropriated special monies to 
fund opposition parties, like Sinn Fein, who do not take this oath but who 
would otherwise be entitled to funding.165 This response to the problem 
presented by disloyal parties, of course, would present obvious constitutional 
problems for countries—like the United States—that have strong free speech 
protections. 
But it is also possible that government in opposition rules will not increase 
the chances of the “Weimar Problem” transpiring. By including members of 
these destabilizing parties in the government and in the exercise of winners’ 
powers, government in opposition rules might actually moderate them. These 
destabilizing parties, once in power, might not want to give up the part of the 
total amount of winners’ powers they have and risk having fewer winners’ 
powers in an entirely new constitutional regime. Political parties desire power, 
and often will moderate to obtain and maintain this power.166 In Northern 
Ireland, for instance, the government in opposition rules of the Sunningdale 
experiment induced destabilizing political figures to work with moderates in 
the government.167 It is true, though, that there will be times when a political 
party will make the assessment that it is better to decline any winners’ powers, 
in the belief that it can destroy the constitutional system enough to possess 
more winners’ powers in another constitutional regime. This was the case in 
Colombia in the middle of the twentieth century, when the Liberal and 
Conservative governments alternated criticizing each other when the other was 
in power, always believing that they could cause the government—and the 
constitution—to collapse and then create a more favorable new constitution.168 
But rare will be the situation when any political party, whatever its political 
beliefs, decides to opt for losers’ powers over winners’ powers. And when an 
 
164.  Id. at 3. 
165.  See KELLY, supra note 154, app. 5, at 19. 
166.  See Donald L. Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict 
Management, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 451, 451-75 (Joseph 
V. Montville ed., 1991). 
167.  See PEACE AT LAST? THE IMPACT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND 
(Jorg Neuheiser & Stefan Wolff eds., 2002).  
168.  See Robert H. Dix, Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia, 12 COMP. POL. 303, 314 
(1980). 
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antisystem party does make the calculation that holding losers’ powers is a 
preferable choice to holding winners’ powers because the constitutional order 
is likely to soon be overturned, there might not be much that institutional rules 
can do anyway. 
iv.  constitutional design for the american scene 
The last Part discussed how government in opposition rules could benefit 
all constitutional systems, stable and fragile, presidential, semipresidential, or 
parliamentary. This Part will focus in greater detail on some of the benefits 
from government in opposition rules for one particular constitutional system, 
the current American constitutional system. This Part is not meant to be an 
exhaustive, complete examination of the ways in which government in 
opposition rules would benefit the current American separation of powers 
regime. Certainly, some of the questions of the desirability and 
constitutionality of such a system require their own separate article. Therefore, 
this Part is a general sketch of some of the main virtues—and issues—related to 
incorporating some of the main structural components of government in 
opposition rules elsewhere into the American system. 
As this Part will discuss, several problems have emerged that could be at 
least partially remedied by creating a more elaborate and consequential series of 
American government in opposition rules. The United States, of course, does 
already have some government in opposition rules. The Seven Member Rule, 
mentioned earlier, permits minorities on certain committees in Congress to 
compel information from the executive branch. Part III also mentioned the 
possibility of federal judges appointed by parties then not part of the electoral 
majority making decisions at a time when the party that appointed them was 
no longer in power. This Part will discuss how expanding the number and 
prominence of rules such as these would have many positive effects for the 
current American constitutional regime. It argues that, only during times of 
unified government (when one party controls all winners’ powers) a series of 
statutory or constitutional provisions should require that members of the 
political party out of power negotiate with the winning political party. The 
result must be, at minimum, some significant (if perhaps not precisely 
specified) number of important cabinet positions, chairmanships of important 
congressional committees, and the ability to nominate a certain number of 
federal judges to be controlled by the leadership of the losing political coalition. 
The increasingly partisan nature of current American politics calls for an 
increasingly partisan constraint on the operation of government. When 
political parties were more fragmented, or political figures voted less based on 
partisan identity, then other constraints worked better—parties had their own 
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internal debates and divides that operated as a form of self-constraint when 
they were in power, and their ideological heterogeneity meant they tolerated 
and cooperated more with parties out of power. But now, when parties are 
more coherent and party voting is central, government in opposition rules 
provide a check on power that accounts for the reality of contemporary partisan 
politics. 
Government in opposition rules would also create a more equitable 
distribution of political power, ensuring that political minorities—whose 
power has been decreasing under both Democratic and Republican-dominated 
governments in Washington—still have a real voice. In other words, 
government in opposition rules are not just necessary to constrain power, but 
also to create the conditions for real democratic politics again. Finally, 
government in opposition rules would create a more efficient administrative 
state, ensuring that an administrative state increasingly dominated by partisan 
politics would have a steady and constant corps of qualified bureaucratic 
officials—and these bureaucratic officials would have less of an incentive to 
cater to political officials. 
A. Problems with the American Separation of Powers 
1. Unified Government 
Separation of powers in the United States works well—perhaps too well—
when winners’ powers are divided among the two major parties, with each 
party controlling at least some bundle of winners’ powers. During those times, 
winners’ powers clash with winners’ powers, and neither political party is able 
to assert hegemonic control over government. But when one political party 
captures all of the levers of power, then the American system of separation of 
powers fails. This is because the result is unified government, or the American 
equivalent of the illiberal democrat: a political leader (George W. Bush in the 
past decade and now Barack Obama) who stands in control of all winners’ 
powers and so poses a real risk of overreach and excess. 
The problem with the American Constitution’s treatment of separation of 
powers during periods of unified government has been explained most recently 
by Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes.169 The creation of multiple bundles of 
winners’ powers, and the allocation of these winners’ powers to different 
branches of government, operated under the assumption that political figures 
would vote and operate out of some degree of loyalty to the branch of 
 
169.  See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 3. 
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government in which they operate, rather than the political party that helped 
get them to that branch of government. In other words, with winners’ powers 
divided among several branches of government, it would not matter who 
controlled each branch of government if political figures voted and acted based 
on their branch identity—if they acted based on what part of the government 
they belonged to rather than the party that created them. The mere fact that a 
political figure was a member of a branch of government meant that their 
voting and loyalties would be determined by that membership. If you were a 
Republican member of the House from Alabama, then the fact that you were a 
Republican or from Alabama did not matter; what did matter is that you were 
a member of the House, and you would be sure to exercise winners’ powers to 
maximize the prerogatives of the House of Representatives. 
This vision of branch loyalty has collapsed, and so with it has the American 
originalist vision of a separation of powers based on branch identity. We 
transitioned from a world where politics involved “affairs of honor”170 to a 
world where politics were characterized by the fact that “party lines predict 
political behavior better than branch ones.”171 Party-line voting was only 
around forty percent about forty years ago; now it is close to three-quarters of 
the time.172 Not only do members of Congress and the President173 vote and act 
according to the positions of their political party, but the two main political 
parties now represent increasingly distinct, coherent, and opposed policy 
platforms,174 and so not only do they strongly oppose and disagree with one 
 
170.  See JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 
(2001). Freeman argues that a key notion during the early years of the Republic—and the 
core animating idea behind the original constitutional design—was that politics was about 
“the establishment and defense of personal honor and reputation, and with offering 
leadership based on . . . personal and social standing.” Robert F. Bauer, Thoughts on the 
Democratic Basis for Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 35 IND. L. REV. 747, 751 n.13 
(2002). 
171.  Levinson & Pildes, supra note 3, at 2326. 
172.  JAMES Q. WILSON & JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 339 tbl.13.4 (10th ed. 
2006); see also id. at 340 (“[P]arty affiliation is still the most important thing to know about 
a member of Congress. Knowing whether a member is a Democrat or a Republican will not 
tell you everything about the member, but it will tell you more than any other single fact.”).  
173.  This partisan behavior is not just a feature of congressional action, but also of the actions of 
the President. During President Bill Clinton’s second term, when he faced a Republican 
Congress, he opposed about two-thirds of the actions of the Congress. See RICHARD S. 
CONLEY, THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: A POSTWAR 
ASSESSMENT: THE ESSENTIALS 29-31 (2003). 
174.  Elena Kagan has noted that the most conservative Democrat is now, according to most 
studies, still more liberal than the most liberal Republican. Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2312 (2001). 
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another, but their internal agreement and unity is also much greater. When not 
one party controls all winners’ powers—during periods of divided government, 
in other words—then there is constraint on winning political coalitions. If 
anything, we might be concerned during periods of divided government that 
there are too many brakes on the political gas pedal, and that not enough is 
done. 
By contrast, during periods of unified government, political constraints do 
not operate as well, if at all. The formal constitutional structure still creates 
multiple bundles of winners’ powers and allocates these to different winners, 
but since these “different” winners are all members of the same political party, 
winners’ powers are combined rather than conflicted. During periods of 
unified government, the President rarely threatens to veto legislation or 
actually vetoes legislation, and there is overwhelming agreement on policy 
issues between the President and Congress, now approaching near ninety-five 
percent of the time. With the President and Congress of the same party, they 
can work together to find federal judges in greater agreement with them, 
federal judges who are thus less likely to prevent them from pursuing their 
agenda and the agenda of their party;175 the same is true of other cabinet 
officials and political appointees of the federal government. In other words, 
government does a lot during periods of unified government, because there are 
no winners’ powers to be used to constrain other winners’ powers. 
If members of the opposing political party were granted a certain basic core 
of winners’ powers during periods of unified government, then there would 
always be a check on the operation of a unified government. With political 
 
175.  Nancy Scherer found, in her study, “that there is no difference in voting behavior between 
judges appointed during united and divided government.” Nancy Scherer, Who Drives the 
Ideological Makeup of the Lower Federal Courts in a Divided Government?, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
191, 191 (2001). But her findings are based on an examination of three areas that, during the 
time period she studied, were not major sources of legal cleavages between the Democratic 
and Republican Parties. See id. at 191 (describing how her study focused on “search and 
seizure cases, race discrimination cases, and federalism cases”). Scherer’s findings have also 
been questioned by other research. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, at xxv (2003) 
(“[There are] problems with Scherer’s analysis [that] are noteworthy”); Tracey E. George, 
Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III Protections, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 221, 239 
(2003) (“[U]nified government is highly correlated with the ability of presidents to name 
judges who match their policy views on a consistent basis in a set of cases. And this result is 
intuitive. When the President’s party controls the Senate, the Administration may meet 
privately with Senate leaders to negotiate over nominees thereby ensuring the selection of 
judges who most closely match the ruling party’s perspectives as well as their rapid 
confirmation. Moreover, unified government limits the role of opposing interest groups in 
judicial selection by denying them access to key decisionmakers and curtailing the public 
portion of the Article II process.”). 
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figures operating according to the best interests of their party, this would 
ensure that, no matter what, a political figure with the opposite interests of the 
party occupying all of the rest of the winners’ powers would have some 
winners’ powers of their own. It would be as if there were always some divided 
government, even in the midst of unified government. Of course, as mentioned 
in the previous Part, the amount of government in opposition rules could be 
varied—perhaps in periods where one party not just controls all winners’ 
powers, but controls them by wide margins, there could be even more 
government in opposition rules—perhaps giving losing political coalitions 
some cabinet positions, a few more deputy cabinet positions, and so on. 
An example of how government in opposition rules might operate—and 
might better constrain unified government—comes from the situation that led 
to the torture memoranda produced by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) several years ago. In early 2002, the OLC 
authored two memos on legal protections afforded to Al Qaeda and Taliban 
captives.176 On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum 
agreeing with this conclusion, and stating that prisoners would be treated in a 
manner “appropriate and consistent with military necessity.”177 Later that same 
year, OLC issued another memorandum about whether interrogation tactics 
that might seem extreme violated certain legal obligations. This memorandum 
concluded that only pain reaching the level of “death, organ failure, or the 
permanent impairment of significant body function”178 might pose legal 
problems, and that even then it could be unconstitutional to apply certain laws 
prohibiting torture to executive exercises of authority in the war on terror.179 In 
January of 2003, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was producing a 
report on proper interrogation techniques, he relied substantially on these 
 
176.  See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Office 
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes 
II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB 81 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE 
PAPERS]; Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t. 
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, and Robert J. Delabunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t. of 
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t. of Def. (Jan. 
9, 2002), in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 38. 
177.  Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), in 
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 176, at 134, 135. 
178.  Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in 
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 176, at 176. 
179.  Id. at 173. 
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memoranda.180 And the Rumsfeld report had major influences on American 
policy towards prisoners, detainees, and the torture of detainees that resulted—
and in many ways led to—the appalling and offensive disaster and consequence 
of the excess of winners’ powers that was Abu Ghraib. 
It is interesting to think how things might have been at least more 
constrained, and potentially even forestalled, if there had been government in 
opposition rules. In actuality, the OLC memos were produced by two OLC 
lawyers, John Yoo and Jay Bybee, with clear Republican credentials and 
affiliations.181 The memoranda were reviewed by a range of officials, all 
Republican-appointed or at least Republican-affiliated officials,182 including by 
then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales.183 While the Senate was 
controlled by the Democrats for a portion of early 2002 when the torture 
memos were first constructed, the Republicans controlled the Senate starting 
in January 2003, the House of Representatives during this entire time, and 
then of course the executive branch during this entire time, when the torture 
memos were being reviewed and implemented. So, of course, there was no one 
exercising winners’ powers to do anything about the torture memoranda. 
It might be that the Democratic Party, as the party in opposition, could 
have or would have done nothing about these memoranda if they did possess 
winners’ powers (by having a Democratic Attorney General, a Democratic head 
of the Office of Legal Counsel, and/or ensuring a sufficient number of 
Democratic chairs of major congressional committees). Perhaps the Democratic 
 
180.  WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY AND OPERATIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS (2003), in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 176, at 286. 
181.  John Yoo clerked for two of the more conservative judges on the federal bench, first Judge 
Laurence H. Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and then Justice 
Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court. He also served as the general counsel to the 
Republican majority on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee during the 1990s. See Berkeley 
Law: University of California: Faculty Profiles, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?facID=235 (last visited June 26, 2009). Bybee was 
appointed a federal judge by the Bush Administration. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, 
and the Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1452 (2005) (“The irony is that Jay S. Bybee, 
who signed the Justice Department’s highly permissive torture memo, is now a federal 
judge.”). 
182.  See Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at A1 (noting 
that the latter Bybee Memorandum “was vetted by a larger number of officials, including 
lawyers at the National Security Council, the White House counsel’s office and Vice 
President Cheney’s office”). 
183.  See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Bush’s Counsel Sought Ruling About Torture, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A1; R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Helped Set the Course for 
Detainees, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2005, at A1. 
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Party, reeling from its losses on the Iraq issue in the 2002 midterm elections, 
would never have constrained the Bush Administration’s policies on torture. 
But when the Democrats regained control of Congress in the 2006 elections, 
they did hold hearings about the torture memoranda and requested 
information as a means of shining light on these problematic documents.184 It 
is true that the Republicans did as well, but with so much more to gain by 
pointing out the foibles of the Republican Bush Administration, this might 
have happened even earlier if the Democrats controlled Congress. Democrats 
might not have cared about torture, but they would have cared about political 
gains, and a niche might have existed for them to expose the torture memos. 
With only losers’ powers as their disposal, they could not do that. But with 
some winners’ powers years later, they could—and if they had some winners’ 
powers years earlier even in the minority—then the torture memos might have 
been revealed earlier, and their disastrous consequences avoided. 
2. Majoritarian Domination 
As mentioned earlier, one global trend in constitutional democracies is to 
reduce the power of losing coalitions—to reduce the importance of and 
protection for the losers’ powers that these losing coalitions traditionally 
exercise. Arend Lijphart has argued that this majoritarian domination is even 
more pronounced in presidential democracies like the United States.185 Several 
structural changes in American politics validate his claim. In the past 
generation, winning coalitions have become more powerful—and losing 
coalitions less powerful. This has meant a gradual suppression of losing 
political coalitions by whichever of the two major political parties constitutes 
the winning political coalition. Government in opposition rules are necessary, 
then, not just to ensure that winning coalitions do not exceed proper 
democratic boundaries, but also to ensure that losing coalitions remain relevant 
when they are in the minority. 
Barbara Sinclair has documented the decrease in the power of minority 
parties in the United States Congress,186 via what the newest and most 
 
184.  See Scott Shane, Two Testify on Memo Spelling Out Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008, 
at A15. 
185.  See, e.g., LIJPHART, supra note 140, at 161 (noting the ways that the presidential system of the 
United States tends to give winners of elections disproportionate lawmaking and other 
powers). 
186.  See BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING: THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POSTREFORM ERA (1995) [hereinafter SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS]; 
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comprehensive book about this trend has called the “procedural polarization” 
of Congress.187 Because of changes in the rules and norms of the House and the 
Senate—although less so in the Senate188—individual members and 
committees in the House and the Senate have much less power than they did 
thirty or forty years ago. Party leaders exercise greater power to select 
committee chairs, to decide which committee will consider legislation, and to 
structure the procedure on the floor of the House or Senate by which the 
collective body will debate and vote on legislation.189 The leaders of the 
majority parties decide who attends summit meetings when the Congress 
meets with the President to resolve disputes, and also raise money through 
special leadership political action committees (PACs) which they use to 
support the campaign efforts of individual members.190 With power 
centralized like this in the hands of the leaders of the winning coalition—rather 
than dispersed among committees and members—the winning coalition has 
become more powerful and more in control of the operations of both houses of 
Congress. And, with parties more coherent and ideological, this has meant 
greater attempts—and ability—to suppress the actions of losing political 
coalitions by the more polarizing and ideological leaders of the winning 
coalition. 
The results for the losers’ powers possessed by losing political coalitions 
have been disastrous. The number of legislative initiatives that were subject to 
open rules that permitted all germane amendments declined from eighty-five 
percent in the 1977-1978 session of the House to about thirty-four percent in 
 
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. 
CONGRESS (1997) [hereinafter SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX]. 
187.  See SEAN M. THERAIULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 218 (2008). 
188.  John Ferejohn, A Tale of Two Congresses: Social Policy in the Clinton Years, in THE SOCIAL 
DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT 49, 68 
(Margaret Weir ed., 1998). (“Everyone agrees that Congress has gradually changed from a 
loosely structured locus of committees and subcommittees operating fairly independently, 
with party leaders serving largely as “traffic cops,” to a more coherent, collegial, partisan, 
and sometimes even centralized institution, where significant policymaking activity 
sometimes takes place in the offices of party leaders, in party caucuses, and on the chamber 
floors. These changes have gone farther and happened faster in the House of 
Representatives than in the Senate . . . but they have been visible in both chambers to 
varying extents.”). 
189.  See John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: 
Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 541 (1997).  
190.  See Gerald M. Pomper, Parliamentary Government in the United States, in THE STATE OF THE 
PARTIES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PARTIES 251 (John C. Green & 
Daniel M. Shea eds., 1999).  
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the 1991-1992 session of the House.191 Committee chairs are increasingly loyal 
and responsive to the majority party in Congress rather than to a range of 
political coalitions.192 Committee members from the losing political coalition 
are given less time to speak.193 
This is the state of affairs for losing political coalitions in Congress, but 
things are not much better when we consider the changing nature of 
presidential power. The President is, after all, the only national majoritarian 
official, the only political figure exercising winners’ powers because of an 
election by a national majority, a national winning coalition. And so the rise in 
presidential power compared to congressional power—the rise in the only 
branch of government constituted almost entirely of members only from the 
winning political coalition—is consequential (there are no losing political 
coalitions exercising losers’ powers in the executive branch). During 
presidencies of both parties, the power of the executive branch has increased. 
The President now submits his own budget request to Congress.194 Presidents 
since FDR have issued a staggeringly greater number of executive orders than 
presidents before them and have centralized control over the regulatory state.195 
The greater number of foreign military commitments—commitments 
supervised by the executive branch—have increased the power of the President 
because of his unilateral control over the main issue of the day.196 The most 
majoritarian person in the American government is now all the more powerful. 
What can be done to ensure that losing political coalitions remain relevant? 
The Democratic or the Republican Party in the United States almost never 
controls more than a bare majority of the seats in the House or Senate, and 
even presidential elections are essentially always decided by a few percentage 
points. Losing political coalitions in the United States have a great share of the 
vote, and so the fact that they have an increasingly small part of the power is 
problematic. This majoritarian domination problem is less severe in the United 
States during periods of divided government. In those situations, the losing 
political coalition still has access to some winners’ powers since they control 
some parts of the federal government. 
 
191.  See SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 186, at 140. 
192.  See SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX, supra note 186, at 105.  
193.  Id. at 6. 
194.  A compelling recent book on the rise of presidential power highlights this and other 
growing manifestations of increased executive power, regardless of which party occupies the 
White House. See MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: 
UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED 19-24 (2007). 
195.  See id. at 24-27.  
196.  Id. at 24-25. 
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But what about during periods of unified government? Assigning these 
losing political coalitions more losers’ powers would not resolve this 
majoritarian domination of American democracy. It would result in the same 
suppression or degradation of losers’ powers that has already transpired in 
regards to existing losers’ powers. Granting losing political coalitions winners’ 
powers during periods of unified government, then, ensures that these 
coalitions and the citizens they represent have their voice heard at least 
somewhat in proportion to their electoral relevance. 
3. Bureaucratic Competence 
One of the goals of a successful system of separation of powers, in addition 
to constraint and how that promotes rights and democratic self-government, is 
governmental competence. And the current American separation of powers 
system hinders excellence in technical administration. The American 
administrative state has always been—and has become even more—political 
than many of its counterparts.197 American bureaucrats understand their role as 
much more political and much less technical than their counterparts in 
nonpresidential systems.198 A substantial number of high-level American 
bureaucratic positions are occupied by political appointees.199 
The consequences of such a political bureaucratic regime are serious. 
Because bureaucratic positions are so political, and the support enjoyed by 
certain officials will vary based on the political climate, tenure in these 
positions is relatively short. The median time served for political appointees is 
about two years.200 Once they complete their service as high-ranking political 
appointees, these bureaucratic officials then often leave government service 
 
197.  Cf. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 702 (“There are, then, some pretty fundamental reasons for 
associating an American-style separation of powers with unattractive forms of bureaucratic 
governance. Worse yet, these theoretical connections are abundantly confirmed in 
practice.”). 
198.  See JOELD D. ABERACH, ROBERT D. PUTNAM & BERT A. ROCKMAN, BUREAUCRATS & 
POLITICIANS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 94-95 (1981); Renate Mayntz & Hans-Ulrich 
Derlien, Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 1970-1987—
Toward Hybridization?, 2 GOVERNANCE 384, 394 (1989) (“[C]ivil servants today distinguish 
their role from that of politicians even more than they did in 1970 . . . .”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
199.  See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 7-13 (1995). 
200.  See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FACT SHEET, POLITICAL APPOINTEES: TURNOVER RATES IN 
EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION, GAO/GGD-94-115FS, 
at 2-3 (1994). 
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altogether, with less than ten percent of political appointees by one count 
remaining in the public sector after their initial appointment.201 Not only do 
these officials not spend time learning their particular job, they do not spend 
time learning how government in general operates. 
With such dramatic and constant turnover, bureaucratic officials cannot 
form working relationships with their colleagues, and do not learn the 
idiosyncrasies of their policy portfolios, or the individuals working on the same 
or related portfolios. This short-term horizon is worsened even more during 
presidential transitions, when, because so many positions are politically 
appointed, there will be so many new officials in control. As the Volcker 
Commission on Public Service put it, “excessive numbers of political 
appointees serving relatively brief periods may undermine the President’s 
ability to govern, insulating the Administration from needed dispassionate 
advice and institutional memory.”202 
But no one believes that bureaucrats, even in a perfectly designed system, 
either can or should be purely technical creatures implementing objectively 
neutral commands with the best available evidence. The days of James 
Landis203 are over, and the pretense of rationality and rationality alone 
justifying bureaucratic actions is gone. In other words, even if we could create a 
separation of powers that promoted pure rationality and was apolitical, no one 
believes in pure politically neutral rationality anymore—and so we need 
political accountability. Creating a European-style civil service for the entire 
federal bureaucracy204 is not a choice for a country that recognizes the need for 
political accountability over bureaucrats.205 
 
201.  See Linda L. Fisher, Fifty Years of Presidential Appointments, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS: 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES AND TRANSIENT GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON 1, 27 (G. Calvin 
Mackenzie ed., 1987). 
202.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE 7 (1989). 
203.  See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-16, 46-50 (1938). 
204.  See Neil Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from 
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2328 (2006) (discussing the “European model . . . that . . . attracts 
excellent college graduates and retains them”). 
205.  For arguments about the importance of accountability in the administrative state see, for 
instance, Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural 
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Gary Lawson, 
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); and Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41. 
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An increase in government in opposition rules would likely raise skepticism 
among those attached to the idea of an American “unitary executive”206 and the 
belief that having all of those exercising executive winners’ powers be 
accountable to the President means that there is greater political 
accountability—after all, a clear, singular person can be blamed for any failures 
in the executive branch—and regulatory coherence and dispatch (again, since 
one figure has ultimate control over executive winners’ powers). It might be 
the case that, as an informal matter, providing members of losing political 
coalitions with executive winners’ powers could reduce some of these benefits 
of the unitary executive, in favor of some of the benefits of a more constrained 
and politically divided executive. But many of the benefits of a unitary 
executive remain. 
After all, while there is little discussion about constitutional constraints on 
requiring the appointment of members of losing political coalitions to cabinet 
positions, as discussed below, we know that there would be major 
constitutional problems with limiting the President’s power to remove these 
cabinet officials from opposing parties,207 and so these government in 
opposition rules would still not undermine the President’s authority to 
terminate cabinet members (from his party or from another party). And “there 
is consensus that the power to remove subordinates who do not follow the 
President’s directives, or in whom he no longer has confidence, is vital to his 
supervisory ability and authorized by the Constitution.”208 Because the 
President could remove members of losing political coalitions, it means that if 
they are interfering too much with the President’s regulatory agenda, he can 
remove them—and if he does not, we know that we can blame the President 
and vote the President out of office. Also, because these government in 
opposition rules are structured whereby members of clearly identifiable 
political parties are appointed, and appointed because of their membership in 
those parties, we know who beyond the President to blame for policy failures. 
For instance, if President Obama were required to appoint Republican Senator 
Orrin Hatch as Attorney General, and the Justice Department made some 
 
206.  For an underappreciated article in this discussion about the unitary executive which makes 
these arguments most clearly, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the 
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995). 
207.  See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1780 (2006) 
(“Conventional wisdom supposes that the President enjoys a power to remove all 
presidentially appointed officers, save for judges. A corollary of this belief is that neither 
Congress nor the judiciary may remove such officers, for when the Constitution grants the 
President a power, it often follows that no one else can enjoy that power.”). 
208.  Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1156 (2000). 
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embarrassing errors, we might blame Obama—after all, Obama would not 
have fired Attorney General Hatch, although he could have—but we also and 
perhaps even more so could blame the Republican Party, because it would be 
Hatch’s status as a member and leader of that party that would have led to 
Hatch’s appointment in the first place. 
Even beyond that, the manner in which members of losing political 
coalitions are appointed can also assist with presidential control and with 
regulatory coherence. In many systems with government in opposition rules—
and so potentially for the United States—the head of the winning political 
coalition must appoint a member of the losing political coalition, but gets to 
choose which member of the losing political coalition to appoint. That was the 
case, for instance, with Nelson Mandela’s appointment of F.W. de Klerk under 
the 1994 interim constitution; Mandela had to appoint a member of de Klerk’s 
party, and decided de Klerk was the most tolerable. This means that a 
President Obama would not have to appoint a Sarah Palin or a Ron Paul to his 
cabinet; he could instead appoint a more moderate and ideologically similar 
Republican like Richard Lugar, who is more likely to pursue the same policy 
goals that the President desires.  
B. Design Fundamentals 
Even if government in opposition rules would be a welcome addition to the 
American constitutional system, the incredible variety of such rules discussed 
in Part II make it clear that there are still some major issues of institutional 
design that need to be resolved first. As Part II mentioned, government in 
opposition rules vary really along three axes: (1) How mandatory are these 
rules; (2) How often are these rules reviewed and what is the exact amount of 
these rules present; and (3) May members of winning and losing coalitions 
exercise powers afforded by these rules. This Part already has mentioned how 
it would be wise to have these rules triggered only when Congress and the 
Presidency are controlled by the same party. This Section elaborates slightly 
more on the specifics of an American government in opposition regime by 
arguing that these rules, when in place, should be mandatory, negotiated, and 
available only to losing coalitions. A central theme of the argument for these 
specific parts of an American government in opposition regime has to deal with 
one of the constitutional evils that this regime is designed to fight, which was 
identified earlier: the absence of constraint in unified government. By 
removing many of these rules from the vagaries of politics—from the vagaries 
that a unified government could take advantage of—these rules would 
guarantee losing political coalitions a degree of power and capacity to constrain 
winning political coalitions. 
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The first major design question is how coercive to make government in 
opposition rules. As we have seen, there are really three potential different 
answers to this question: (1) mandatory government in opposition rules, of the 
genre in South Africa, where if the losing political party achieves a certain 
degree of success then they are guaranteed winners’ powers—and of course the 
guarantee can arise from constitutional provision, statutory requirement, or an 
informal norm rising to the level of coerciveness of a legal norm; (2) 
encouraged government in opposition rules, of the genre related to the judicial 
appointments process in Germany, where the rules create certain strong 
incentives that could lead to losing political parties exercising winners’ powers; 
and (3) permitted government in opposition rules, where no rules or norms 
prevent losing political parties from exercising winners’ powers, but nor are 
there any requirements or incentives either. 
Because many countries have experimented with rules from each of these 
three categories, we have much information about the consequences of these 
different genres of government in opposition rules. And the evidence suggests 
that, since government in opposition rules are meant to counteract the problem 
of the illiberal democrat that can arise from unified government, the more 
coercive the rules the more they are likely to have their intended effect. The 
more government in opposition rules can be manipulated by the normal 
political process, the less they will constrain the illiberal democrat that the 
President of the United States can become during periods of unified 
government. Where there is no sense of obligation to make government in 
opposition rules practically meaningful, then leaders of winning coalitions will 
only honor these rules when it is in their political interests to do so—which 
defeats the entire purpose of having these rules in the first place. This means 
that if these rules follow from informal understandings, they are easier to be 
ignored by a particularly powerful winning political coalition; while they still 
might be ignored by that same coalition if they are more coercive, there at least 
will be more of a political and potentially even legal cost for doing so. 
Consider the experience with government in opposition rules in stable 
democratic countries similar to the United States. In Great Britain, some of the 
government in opposition rules result from statutory obligations, such as Short 
Money provided to opposition parties.209 These rules have remained relatively 
 
209.  See, e.g., Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1994, S.I. 1994/3206 (increasing salaries); 
Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1991, S.I. 1991/2886 (increasing salaries); Ministerial 
and Other Salaries Order, 1987, S.I. 1987/1836 (increasing salaries). The foundational 
statute is really the Ministerial and Other Salaries Act, 1975, c. 27 (Eng.). The Act 
superseded the structure established by the Opposition by the Ministers of the Crown Act 
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stable and permanent, and if anything have only been expanded in the 
direction of granting more power to losing political coalitions. By contrast, 
Prime Minister’s Questions, which are merely the product of an informal 
understanding, were altered when a very popular political figure, Tony Blair, 
became Prime Minister. In 1961, Parliament established a twice-weekly event 
called “Prime Minister’s Questions,” with each session lasting forty-five 
minutes—but this was established simply as a matter of parliamentary norm, 
not because of any statutory or other formal change.210 Once Blair came into 
office, he limited Prime Minister’s Questions to once a week, and limited the 
number of questions that his Cabinet would respond to as part of the 
customary (and not compelled) Question Days procedure,211 the elite “FOIA” I 
referenced earlier in this Article. Blair was criticized for changing the Prime 
Minister’s Questions and Question Days procedures, but because he was not 
repealing a statutory or constitutional command, the criticisms he faced were 
minimal and largely inconsequential. 
Without any compulsion to ensure that losing political coalitions exercise 
winners’ powers, members of winning political coalitions will give power to 
losing political coalitions only when winning political coalitions are weak and 
in need of a political boost—in other words, at the very moment when winning 
political coalitions are so weak that winning political coalitions do not need to 
be constrained in the first place. Prime Minister Gordon Brown expressed an 
interest in having a “government of all the talents,”212 but that was when his 
Labour Party was essentially tied with the opposition Conservatives despite 
having triumphed overwhelmingly in the past few elections.213 Likewise, 
President Bill Clinton, under no obligation to appoint Republicans to his 
cabinet, appointed Republican Senator William Cohen to be his Secretary of 
 
1937. See SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS, AND USAGES OF 
PARLIAMENT 252 n.19 (20th ed. Butterworths 1983). 
210.  See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive 
Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 264 (2008).  
211.  See HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, FACTSHEET P1 PROCEDURE SERIES: PARLIAMENTARY 
QUESTIONS (JUNE 2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/ 
P01.pdf. 
212.  See Colin Brown & Nigel Morris, Brown Completes Government of “All Talents” with Team of 
Outsiders, INDEP. (U.K.), June 30, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ 
politics/brown-completes-government-of-all-talents-with-team-of-outsiders-455341.html.  
213.  See Poll Watch: June 2007, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6264488.stm 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
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Defense only when he had the political need to shore up his defense 
credentials.214 
It is true, of course, that any rule, no matter how legally or informally 
binding, can still be repealed by a broad and bold enough winning political 
coalition. But, as mentioned earlier, there are all sorts of reasons related to time 
and resource constraints that would prevent a winning political coalition from 
repealing or ignoring a mandatory government in opposition rule. In 
particular, in a stable democratic system like the United States, foundational 
parts of public law—what William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have called 
“super-statutes,”215 such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964216—remain in effect 
many years after their enactment and after enduring unified government of 
both parties. Even some of the American government in opposition rules, such 
as the Seven Member Rule or the blue slip process, go back a long time and 
have survived government by Democrats and Republicans. 217 
The second major design question to resolve about an American 
government in opposition regime is how to go about determining the precise 
amount of government in opposition rules; is the amount to be fixed or 
negotiated, and is it to be proportionate or ascertained through some other 
mechanism? Again, there is a range of experience to draw from, from the 
negotiated rules that exist for much of the British government in opposition 
regime to the constitutionally fixed and proportionate system of the Interim 
South African Constitution. 
However important it is for government in opposition rules to be 
mandatory—so they are not repealed or substantially undermined by a unified 
government—it is also the case that making these rules too mandatory and 
removed from the normal democratic updating process makes these rules as 
susceptible to countermajoritarian attacks as the courts. Removing these rules 
too much from the democratic process makes them reflective of an outdated 
reality, and also makes them seem less legitimate. In Lebanon, for instance, the 
 
214.  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 901 
(2007). 
215.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001). 
If the government in opposition rules were to be made binding as part of statutory law, they 
would probably be considered super-statutes. 
216.  Id. at 1237-42 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a super-statute). 
217.  The Seven Member Rule goes back to 1966. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 2954 (2006). The blue slip 
process goes as far back as 1954. See Memorandum from Senate Judiciary Comm. Staff to 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 22, 1979), reprinted in 
Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th 
Cong. 118, 119 (1979) (“The blue slip has been used for over 25 years, according to former 
committee staff members . . . .”). 
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government in opposition rules created by the National Pact of 1943 were 
initially very popular and broadly effective. With time, though, Muslim leaders 
began to criticize these rules as unrepresentative of the new demographics of 
the country.218 Likewise, demographics had shifted, so that the initial six to five 
Christian to Muslim ratio for parliamentary elections was outdated and the size 
of the Muslim population had probably surpassed the size of the Christian 
population.219 So, to ensure that government in opposition rules remain 
legitimate and current, they should be negotiated with some frequency. 
Finally, one other design question related to government in opposition 
rules is whether to make them available to losing as well as winning political 
coalitions; using the terminology of this Article, then, the question is whether 
these rules should be generally applicable. The experience with generally 
applicable government in opposition rules is similar to the experience with 
government in opposition rules that are optional or encouraged; powerful 
winning coalitions are able to minimize the degree to which losing political 
coalitions actually benefit from these rules. When government in opposition 
rules are made broadly available to winning and to losing political coalitions, 
winning political coalitions—with their greater resources and political appeal—
are able to prevent losing political coalitions from benefiting from these rules. 
Again, the experience with the Blair Government once it first came into 
power is instructive. Not only did the Blair Government reduce the time 
permitted for Prime Minister’s Questions and the amount of questions that it 
would answer as part of its Question Days procedure, but it also dominated the 
Question Days procedure. With more members of Parliament, and therefore 
more assistants working for those members of Parliament, Blair’s Labour Party 
had a greater capacity to use the Question Days procedure, even though it was 
formally available to the Labour Party and all other parties in Parliament.220 
If losing coalitions and only losing political coalitions can use government 
in opposition rules, though, there are some other concerns. As a political 
matter, these rules—protecting only the interests of political minorities—might 
be seen as “quotas” in the way that certain political forces derailed the 
nomination of Lani Guinier to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
for supporting proportionate representation.221 Likewise, if winning political 
 
218.  See Richard Hrair Dekmejian, Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon, 10 
COMP. POL. 251, 254 (1978). 
219.  See Brenda M. Seaver, The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon, 115 
POL. SCI. Q. 247, 255-59 (2000). 
220.  See DURKIN & GAY, supra note 159, at 1. 
221.  One day after Guinier was nominated, the conservative press labeled her a “quota queen.” 
See Clint Bolick, Clinton’s Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12. This is what she 
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coalitions are entirely excluded from exercising certain powers or holding 
certain positions, it might bring us back to Adrian Vermeule’s concern that 
submajority rules like government in opposition rules could be chronically 
unstable because they can always be reserved by the winning political 
coalition.222 This is the flip side of Heather Gerken’s arguments about how 
“dissenting by deciding” creates more responsible winners by sensitizing 
winners to the needs and concerns of losers.223 If political losers exercise 
unilateral winners’ powers—even if those exercises of winners’ powers can be 
overturned by winning coalitions—then they might be less inclined to consider 
the interests of winning political coalitions, and so might not negotiate a 
compromise solution with winning coalitions that will prevent their actions 
from being constantly overturned. 
C. The Constitutional Considerations 
As the previous several Sections discussed, the experience with government 
in opposition rules around the world, and the nature of the current American 
political scene—suggest that an American government in opposition regime 
should apply when there is divided government, and should require that, after 
negotiation, there be a certain minimum number of high-ranking government 
officials from the opposing political party. But could Congress do this by 
statute, the kind of framework statute that other recent pieces of legal 
scholarship have proposed as reforms to the American separation of powers 
regimes?224 This is an interesting constitutional question, and one deserving of 
its own article. For now, I will offer some general thoughts about some of the 
constitutional considerations involved in such a framework statute. 
Congress could almost certainly pass a statute requiring that, after 
negotiations after each congressional election, the losing political coalition be 
awarded a certain number of committee chair positions and be given other 
powers in Congress. Congress has passed other major pieces of legislation that 
 
was called going forward, even though she actually opposed quotas. See LANI GUINIER, THE 
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 19, 
189 (1994). 
222.  See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 88 (“[S]ubmajoritarian decisions are exposed to reversal by 
subsequent majorities, and might thus be chronically unstable.”). 
223.  See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2. 
224.  Bruce Ackerman has proposed that Congress could exercise broad executive emergency 
powers by increasing supermajorities through a framework statute. See Ackerman, supra 
note 3, at 1077 (“Throughout the twentieth century, Congress has enacted ‘framework 
statutes’ that have sought to impose constitutional order on new and unruly realities that 
were unforeseen by the Founders. The same technique will serve us well here.”). 
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regulate internal congressional procedures, such as the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 about congressional committee jurisdiction and 
chair powers.225 The weightier constitutional questions arise when we discuss 
whether Congress could pass a statute commanding the President to appoint 
members of losing political coalitions to executive and judicial positions. 
Since government in opposition rules are meant to give members of losing 
political coalitions substantial winners’ powers, we are talking more about 
what the Constitution says about the appointment of “principal officers.”226 To 
the extent that Congress can control whom the President may appoint as 
principal officers, much depends on the amount of executive power to be 
exercised by these principal officers.227 The framework government in 
opposition statute discussed in this Article would require the President to 
appoint as cabinet officials certain members of the opposing political party, so 
presumably he would be appointing these officials to positions in which they 
would exercise executive power. 
There are no cases directly addressing the constitutionality of the forms of 
statutory limitations on the President’s appointment of principal officers 
imagined by a government in opposition framework statute. There is a long 
historical practice of Congress placing some statutory limitations on the 
President’s power to appoint, and Myers v. United States228 seems to indicate 
these limitations are constitutionally acceptable since “[b]oth the majority and 
dissent in Myers v. United States agreed that statutory qualifications for 
officeholders were generally constitutional.”229 Going as far back as the 
 
225.  Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946); see George B. Galloway, The Operation of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 59-62 (1951) (discussing the importance 
of this statute for congressional organization). 
226.  For the constitutional text supporting the distinction between “inferior” and “principal” 
officers, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
227.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986) (“To permit an officer controlled by 
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress 
could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion 
found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over the 
execution of the laws . . . is constitutionally impermissible.”). 
228.  272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
229.  Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal 
Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 772 (2008); see Myers, 272 U.S. at 128-29 (deciding that 
limitations on the President’s Appointments Power are constitutional); id. at 265 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“Every President has consistently observed [statutory qualifications for 
officeholders]. This is true of those offices to which he makes appointments without the 
advice and consent of the Senate as well as of those for which its consent is required.”); see 
also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 740 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is entirely proper for Congress 
to specify the qualifications for an office that it has created . . . .”). 
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Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has placed limitations on whom the President 
could appoint even to cabinet positions such as Attorney General.230 Congress 
has also placed many statutory limitations on who could hold other positions 
that, while perhaps still executive in nature, are certainly less executive in 
nature than the power exercised by an official like the Attorney General.231 
There are those who are critical of this practice,232 but this practice is certainly 
long and substantial. 
Congressionally imposed constraints on the President’s power of 
appointment become more constitutionally problematic, though, when they 
remove entirely the President’s power to choose whom he or she desires to 
become a “principal officer.” In the statutory regimes discussed above, the 
President still ultimately decides whom to appoint, and Congress only limits 
what types of people qualify for positions—but still ultimately leaves it to the 
President to choose among many thousands or even millions of options of 
whom to appoint to a principal officer position. Even when the President faces 
limitations on the power to appoint based on partisan identity—such as in the 
case of the Federal Communications Commission and other independent 
agencies, where “agency statutes require political balance, i.e., no more than a 
bare majority of members of multi-member agencies may come from the same 
political party, but there are exceptions”233—the President still ultimately 
decides whom precisely to appoint. 
 
230.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789) (requiring that the Attorney 
General be “learned in the law”); see, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 265-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(collecting a large number of statutes prescribing qualifications for officeholders between 
1789 and 1926). 
231.  See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2006) (giving political party requirements for members of 
FEC); 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(2) (listing professional experience requirements for the 
Administrator of FEMA); 29 U.S.C. § 12 (requiring that the Director of the Women’s 
Bureau at the Department of Labor must be a woman); 31 U.S.C. § 703(a) (establishing 
appointment of the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from a list of three or more individuals 
prepared by a nominating commission); An Act To Provide a Government for the Territory 
of Hawaii, ch. 339, § 66, 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900) (noting citizenship and age requirements for 
the territorial governor of Hawaii); An Act To Remodel the Diplomatic and Consular 
Systems of the United States, ch. 133, § 9, 10 Stat. 619, 623 (1855) (establishing a citizenship 
requirement for diplomatic officials, some of whom have confirmation appointments). 
232.  See, e.g., 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 248, 250 (1989) (arguing that statutory qualifications for 
principle officers are unconstitutional, but not stating an opinion about statutory 
qualifications for inferior officers); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive 
Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 467, 534-35 
(1998). 
233.  Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1139 (2000). 
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The framework statute suggested by this Part, though, envisions the 
opposition party in the United States unilaterally identifying whom to appoint 
to a principal officer position, similar to the predominant government in 
opposition model in use around the world. The American statute is structured 
this way precisely to constrain presidential authority during times of unified 
government; to ensure that the President cannot pick a moderate member of 
the opposing party, who could very easily become another presidential 
supplicant. In the government in opposition regime suggested for the United 
States in this Article, for instance, President-elect Obama would not have the 
chance to appoint any Republican to be his Secretary of Defense, thereby 
giving him the chance to appoint a more bipartisan or left-leaning Republican 
(perhaps someone such as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates). Instead, the 
Republican Party would themselves nominate precisely whom they want to 
serve as Obama’s Secretary of Defense (perhaps obliging Obama to accept 
someone such as John McCain).  
This element of the framework statute is what might make the statute 
unconstitutional under constitutional doctrine, particularly after Buckley v. 
Valeo,234 and therefore permissible only after a constitutional amendment. 
Alternatively, the framework statute could be modified still to constrain the 
President, but giving the President more power than simply forcing him or her 
to accept whomever the opposition party deems desirable for an appointment. 
For instance, the opposition party might provide the President with a list of 
names, and the President would have complete discretion to choose from that 
list of names. In this way, the threat of an omnipotent President during times 
of unified government is somewhat constrained (since the President cannot 
appoint anyone), but the President still holds the ultimate power to appoint 
(since the President chooses whom to appoint from the list provided by the 
opposite party). 
Regardless of the constitutional issues, could a framework statute—or, for 
that matter, a constitutional amendment creating government in opposition 
rules—ever really happen? Both John McCain235 and Barack Obama236 
 
234.  424 U.S. 1, 127 (1976) (noting that the constitutional problems with the statute for the 
Federal Election Commission include that “with respect to four of the six voting members of 
the [Federal Election] Commission, neither the President, the head of any department, nor 
the Judiciary has any voice in their selection”). 
235.  See, e.g., McCain: I Will Appoint Democrats to My Cabinet, FOX NEWS, Sept. 7, 2008, available 
at http://right-mind.us/blogs/blog_0/archive/2008/09/09/62962.aspx (“Republican John 
McCain said Sunday if he’s elected president, he will appoint Democrats to his Cabinet.”). 
236.  See, e.g., Sarah Baxter, Brainstorming Obama Plans To Pick Republicans For Cabinet, TIMES OF 
LONDON, Mar. 2, 2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ 
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mentioned during their campaigns their desire to appoint members of the 
opposing party to their cabinet. More broadly, the political scene in the United 
States features the same elements that led to the creation of government in 
opposition rules in other countries: a close division of popularity between a 
finite number of political parties and an increasing polarization and intensity of 
preferences divided among this finite number of parties. In these situations, 
political parties and their leaders in other countries have jointly agreed to create 
government in opposition rules, to protect their parties and their interests in 
case they do end up in the minority after certain elections.237 
conclusion 
At a time when British politics has been dominated by exceptionally large 
figures—titans with names like Blair and Thatcher—Edward Short is a 
relatively simple figure. He does not come from great wealth, and he has served 
rather inconsequentially in a few leadership positions in British politics. Short 
might best be known as the oldest current living member of the Parliament of 
Great Britain at ninety-six years old. But Short’s revolution in separation of 
powers will outlast him and all of us. Short might not have the brilliance of a 
Madison or a Montesquieu, but his innovations in separation of powers have 
been almost as consequential. Short triggered much of the current government 
in opposition system in Britain, which in turn has inspired the similar regimes 
around the world that have been the subject of this Article. And these changes 
have been as revolutionary and consequential as any other constitutional 
modifications of the past several decades. 
The system that Short helped create, which this Article calls government in 
opposition, has changed the relationship between majorities and minorities, 
and between electoral winners and electoral losers. Elections are not zero-sum 
games, with the winners controlling all of the levers of power. Now, those who 
lose an election will maintain some control, some capacity to influence power. 
This otherwise simple idea has become complicated, because it has manifested 
 
us_and_americas/us_elections/article3466823.ece (“Obama is hoping to appoint cross-party 
figures to his cabinet such as Chuck Hagel, the Republican senator for Nebraska and an 
opponent of the Iraq war, and Richard Lugar, leader of the Republicans on the Senate 
foreign relations committee.”). 
237.  See Shannon Roesler, Permutations of Judicial Power: The New Constitutionalism and the 
Expansion of Judicial Authority, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 545, 555 (2007) (discussing new 
scholarship that argues that the “configuration that makes future electoral victory uncertain 
for the constitutional drafters favors a constitution delegating substantial authority to a 
constitutional court”). 
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itself in many forms in many countries around the world, and in constitutional 
systems of all varieties and ages. 
An idea like this spreads because it works, and because it has much to offer 
the constitutions of the countries that have adopted it. Fragile democracies 
concerned about coups and revolutions can ensure that perpetual and 
permanent constraints on majorities will prevent that from happening. Stable 
democracies concerned about the more stable yet still potent hubris of electoral 
majorities can temper that hubris with the power granted to electoral 
minorities in government in opposition systems. All voices are represented in 
government, not just in dissent but in governing. And bureaucracies can use 
their expertise to pursue good policy, without letting good politics interfere. 
These are generalities for all constitutions, but the specifics are just as 
compelling. Constitutions around the world might benefit from Short’s 
insights, but the United States in particular can learn from Short as well. The 
past eight years placed debates about separation of powers at the heart of the 
meaning of our Constitution, as central to the American constitutional debate 
as questions about abortion and affirmative action. Discussions in the Supreme 
Court about the War on Terror, in cases like Hamdi and Hamdan, have been 
mostly about the optimal division of power between our branches of 
government. And, at the end of the day, while our centuries of experience have 
much to offer us, Short’s ideas about the separation of powers, and their 
manifestations around the globe, can show the way for an American and a 
global separation of powers for the future. 
